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Introduction 
'The EE 635 course in the School of Electrical Engineering at Purdue University 
covers the operation and control of electric power systems. The main course elements 
are economic dispatch, unit commitment, and generation control. Each semester, I ask 
the students to prepare a term paper on a topic of present interest. The student papers 
are on different aspects of a given subject. These papers are assembled into a 
technical report. This semester, the topic is "real time pricing" (RTP), an innovative 
pricing technique in which the price of electrical energy varies. The concept of RTP 
allows added "control" of the demand and some proponents feel that the power system 
can be operated more efficiently. The topics cover RTP techniques, wheeling, cost of 
energy, and proposed configurations of the RTP technique. 




Alternative Real Time Pricing Infrastructures 
C. A. Lozano 
Introduction 
Red Time Pricing (RTP) brings information concerning the time-varying costs of 
e1e:ctricity generation, transmission, and distribution to the consumer. The theory of real 
time pricing was developed under the name of spot pricing [I]. Real Time Pricing of 
e1e:ctricity is based on inclusion of time- variable costs of electricity supp~ly in the electricity 
rates. Under RTP, operation of various end use devices can be optimized in order to 
ca:pture the savings associated with the variability of prices. The ideal real time price is a 
combination of the following time- variable components: [lo] 
Marginal generation he1 cost 
Marginal generation and network maintenance cost 
Marginal cost of network losses 
Generation and network quality of supply cost 
Under real time prices, price patterns and magnitude of prices change every day. The last 
component can be thought of as a time- variable demand charge which coincides with 
times of high utility loads. In contrast to demand charges under Time of Use rates, under 
RlrP the highest prices occur closer to the time of supply constraints, and not necessarily 
during the high period demand for the customers [I]. Real time pricing is also applicable 
to reactive power, as shown in [8]. 
This paper is divided in two sections. The first section includes a categorization of prices 
by two modules, time and price. In the second section is shown some foirms of generation 
anti communication of prices to the customer from the utility. At the end of this paper it is 
shown a table with some companies using combinations of the time and price 
caitegorization. 
1.1. Categorization of Prices 
Three basic reasons are identified in electric market for initiation of rate categories: 
In response to customer demands for additional time differentiation in rates 
To hold off further pressure from regulatory bodies 
To build load or to strategically shifi load 
Real time differentiated rates have two types that are common in the industry: demand 
charge and interruptible rate. Demand charge is a rate whose full effect is felt in a limited 
time period, the time at which customer reaches his peak for a given month. For instance, 
if demand is $ 5 / W  for a month, measured in terms of a 15 minute peak, and the energy 
charge is $0.03/kWh, then, the effective cost/kWh for the time of peak clemand is 
5*60min,l5min +0.03= $20.03/kWh. 
In1:erruptible rate is equivalent to time varying prices. For most interruptible rates the 
customer has agreed (in exchange for a favorable rate structure) to redu'ce his load in 
tarns of a fixed level of demand. The time at which a customer must recluce his load is 
determined by the utility, subject to an agreed upon advance warning frc~m moments to 
days. The value of the interruptible rate to the utility is a function of the amount of 
wiuning time that it must give to customers before interrupt. The shorter the warning 
time, the more valuable the interruption is to the utility and the more cositly it is to the 
customer. 
Electric utilities base the calculation of rates structures in two domains: time and price 
[l 'I]. There are three basic characteristics in the time domain and two characteristics of 




and warning time. 
Update cycle is the length of time that a quoted price is valid. This update cycle reflects 
thr: time steps in which a utility operates its major facilities and balances its system. Update 
cycle is divided in four time steps: 
Zero to sixty minutes update cycles: The utility makes its operating level decisions for 
intlividual units and enters into short term purchases and sales with otheir utilities. This 
structure is only in existence for utility interchange, but not in existence in rates between a 
utility and its customers. 
Ilaily update cycles: These are typical of unit commitment logic for uti.lities where a 
foi-ecast of one day is determined. The most commonly seen high speed, high time 
diiyerentiated utility rate are those with a time unit of one hour. These rates are generally 
subject to an advanced warning of between 4 and 12 hours. Price increments for these 
rates are frequently continuous or tiered. The highly time differentiated ]-ate structures are 
those that are most similar to spot pricing, which attempt to deliver to ci~stomers price 
infbrmation based on short run marginal cost and time differentiated information that 
brings costs and price into line as nearly as possible. 
Weekly update cycles: reflect utility time scales of maintenance and reheling 
Monthly update cycles: reflect utility time scales of maintenance and refueling. 
Update Cycle Time Unit Advanced Warning 4 ~05Yminutes  '0  
0 to 60 minutes b 0 to 20 minutes 
Daily R o y  blocks 
Daily 
0 to 4 hours 
4 to 12 hours 
Hour to multiple hour 
w y  Daily Weekly time time block block ]-blt04dap 
Weekly 
Hour to multiple hour 
Daily time block 
Monthly Weekly time block 1< 1 to 4 days 
Monthly time block 1 to 2 weeks 
Monthly 
Irregular 
Figure I. 1. Time dimensions. 
Time unit is the period definition or the number of separate prices that are quoted within 
an update cycle. Thus for the zero-to-hourly update cycle, there are only two time 
dimensions available: 1 to 5 minutes and 1 hour. For the daily update cycle there are three 
or more time domains, starting fiom the one hour time unit to a day as a. whole. For the 
weekly and monthly update cycles the time unit is a subdivision of a week, such as days or 
week days divided fiom weekends. Also, for the monthly update cycle the time unit goes 
fiom days to a month as a whole. The fastest spot price that has been im~plemented is 30 
minutes (most implementations involve one hour time steps, which may be prespecified 24 
hours in advance) [9]. 
Warning time is the amount of time in advance of an event that is given .to a customer 
before a cycle changes or before prices are updated. The warning time is a function of the 
length of the update cycle and the time unit. Warning time, as shown in figure I. 1, goes 
ficlm a minimal time unit but not greater than half of the whole time unit. 
Calculation Base Price Increments 
Short run marginal cost Continuous 
Tiered 
Interrupt 
- ""usOperating cost (System Lambda) 
\\ Interrupt \ Single 
Av'zrage cost Continuous 
Tiered 
Interrupt 
De:mand/ capacity cost Continuous 
Tiered 
Interrupt 
Figure 1.2. Price dimensions 
In the price domain there are two significant characteristics: calculation base and price 
incaements. These characteristics are shown in figure 1.2. Calculation base is the degree to 
which the price reflects the short run marginal cost. The price calculatio~l is divided in four 
Short run marginal cost based rates are rates derived from the theory of spot pricing. 
Short run marginal cost pricing structure includes the operating cost, the: system cost for 
geineration and the system cost for the network. 
Th~e marginal operating cost of serving a particular customer at a particu~lar time is defined 
as the change in energy and other variable costs that is expected to accompany an 
inciremental change in that customer's load [2]. These costs include those variable costs 
that may be wholly or partially incurred due to capacity constraints. The factors that 
determine the marginal operating cost include : 
generation system mix 
individual plant economic and reliability performance 
the cost of he1 
unit commitment and economic dispatch procedures 
plant and network operating constraints 
losses and demand characteristics 
All! these factors influence the extent, location, and timing of electricity production. For an 
estimation of the day- ahead hourly marginal operating cost is necessary to follow the next 
four steps: 
1. Hourly loads and external exchanges with other utilities must be forecast for the next 
daly. 
2.- All the generating units that are expected to be on dispatch on the fol.lowing day 
should be represented with linear incremental cost curves adjusted for losses and 
transmission constraints. 
3 .- Solve the economic dispatch problem for each hour with area net interchange 
co~xstraints added to the problem formulation. 
4.- The forecast estimates should be tracked carehlly and validated against actual hourly 
marginal costs because the marginal operating cost forecasts may be inaccurate due to 
methodological problems, forecasting errors, or other factors. 
Operating cost or system lambda capture the variable operating costs but not any 
cajpacity costs. 
Average cost refers to the cost of service based. 
I)emand/ capacity cost. Here the rate charged to customers is either the actual demand 
ch'arge or is an equivalent of demand for consumption in excess of a pre-specified level. 
Demand cost is also related with marginal outage cost in the sense that the customer must 
p?y more when the energy is limited. 
Muginal outage costs quantify the incremental economic effects of load changes upon the 
quality or reliability of electricity service. Marginal outage costs depend upon both the 
economic damages due to outages and upon the risk of outages occurring. Marginal 
outage costs are the product of outage costs per unit of interruption times the change in 
interruption levels attributable to an incremental change in load. Outage costs can be 
estimated in several ways, the ideal probably being a combination of the survey and 
demand- curve approaches. This estimation needs to be undertaken at very infrequent 
intervals, no more than once in several years. Marginal outage characteristics can be 
forecast using an appropriately designed power- flow analysis program. It can be forecast 
on a day- ahead basis, and should be re- forecast every day. Because the marginal outage 
characteristics will change daily, so will forecast marginal outage costs. 
Price increments is the number of prices available to customers. Price increments are 
divided in four categories: 
(Zontinuous rate is the level seen by the customer which could v q  fiom zero to infinity. 
'Tiered rate is where there are tiers to the rates, i.e., rates may be level 1, level 2, level 3 
out to level N. 
Interruptible rate is one in where the source is interruptible, that is, rates are either in 
category 1 or in another level where the second category may be infinite, discrete, or 
continuous. In this structure, generally the customer must respond to the utility's request, 
be penalized significantly or  be removed from the interruptible program. The base line rate 
for interruptible rate is calculated as the marginal or average cost of supl~lying customers 
for a fixed amount of time during a year. It is generally calculated in advance based on an 
exlpected value of cost and of a cost based recovery of required revenues. Revenue 
neutrality: is the requirement that the utility's revenue from a customer who is under RTP 
be the same as it was under the previous rate if the customer's consumpt;ion pattern 
remains the same as it was under the previous rate [I]. 
The critical element in most interruptible rates is the time of warning prior to interrupt. 
The shorter the period of warning the higher the value to the utility, and generally, the 
higher the cost to the customer. Inversely, the longer the time warning, the lower the value 
to the utility. 
Single rate is a rate that is only at a single level (flat rate). 
Also, in the price domain there is a rate structure differentiation that may range from a 
penalty for noncompliance to  an incentive for compliance. This range is divided in three 
blocks: 
Incentives only 
Incentives and penalty 
penalty only. 
1nc:entives only is a theoretical definition because the utility does not respond with money 
or any material incentives to  the customer when this follow all the requirements of the 
supplier. Instead, the utility does not penalize the customer for malfhnction of the energy 
anti in hands of the customer is the consideration of violating or not the lules in the 
agreement with the supplier. 
Penalty only is related with demand cost described above. The customer must pay more 
for the excessive use of electricity in times of high demand, or the customer could be 
penalized in the form that the supplier does not sell more energy to that customer for 
determined time. 
In pricing of electricity, the price is generated by a combination of the caltegorization 
presented here besides other forms of pricing that the supplier and the customer agree. An 
application of pricing categories is shown in [3]. Next it is a description of one form of 
pricing taking into account the outage costs. 
In the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 appears an ambiguous term which 
reikrs to a price a utility must pay to qualified industrial cogenerators for electricity. This 
term is "Avoided Costs", and it has caused problems because the absence of consistent 
pricing policy of electricity. From this, many pricing policies of electricity for non utility 
generated power have arisen. One of this methods is Reliability Differentiated Real Time 
Pricing (RDP) [7] which present a welfare maximizing policy for pricing non utility 
generated power. With this method, the purchase price of electrical energy at any time and 
location is set equal to the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity at that time and to 
that location. Also, the price of firm capacity purchase from neighboring utilities, 
cogenerators, and independent power producers is set equal to the expected value of the 
marginal capacity cost or the shadow price of the capacity addition at that time and 
1oc:ation. 
It is assumed that a public utility owns and operates the generating plants and transmission 
network and it sells electricity to independent customers. Customers c o ~ ~ l d  be residential, 
commercial, industrial, or independent power producers. Utility is assumed to be able to 
sei. and communicate prices instantly to the customers and each customer could have 
diiyerent price. These prices are subject to the cost of generating power and the cost of 
reliability supply of electricity to customers. One of the main causes of pricing is an 
outage. Outage cost is defined as the price a customer is willing to pay to avoid an outage. 
Incurring in an outage, causes problems in to the customer, for instance, in the form of 
interruption processes. Outage costs depend upon the timing, frequency,, duration, and 
extent of the outage. In [4] there are some algorithms to establish foundcations for the 
determination of the expected costs resulting from system outages. 
Price of 
Electricity 
Figure 1.3. Relations between price of electricity and electricity demand. 
Fipre  1.3 shows relations between price of electricity and electricity dennand. Curve DD 
shows the expected short run customer demand, D'E is the very short m.n customer 
demand curve, SS is the supply curve of electricity, and Qie is the equili1)rium demand of 
customer I at time t for the published expected price Pie. When supply is3 cut back to Qoi 
the: area D'FE represents the outage cost for the customer, the are under the short run 
demand curve DD gives the loss in customer benefit, and Poi is the price the customer is 
willing to pay in the very short run for continued supply of electricity. Note that the very 
short run curve is very steep, meaning the customer could pay more to a.void any 
interruption of electricity [6] .  This analysis is also presented for the long run term where it 
is assumed the utility buys energy at a price pt and firm capacity ot. Herept is the same 
expected marginal operating cost and ot is the expected marginal capacii~y cost. With these 
considerations it is generated the Lagrangian equations of the system for the consumer 
maurimization problem and for the Welfare Maximization problem (utility). The solutions 
for these equations show very interesting results, like the independence of the customer's 
energy consumption and production decisions and the fact that consumer demand is equal 
to this marginal benefit plus marginal outage cost. Also, the customer will produce 
e1c:ctricity to set marginal production cost equal to the price of electrical energy purchase 
and add capacity until marginal capacity cost equals the price of capacity purchase by the 
utility. For welfare maximization, the purchase of price of electric energ? must equal the 
marginal cost of producing electricity by the utility, and the purchase price of firm capacity 
must equal the shadow price of capacity addition for the utility. 
1.1:. Generation and Publication of Price 
Prices for electricity are generated and communicated to the customer in several forms. 
The generation of pricing depends on the system as well as the type of a,greement between 
supplier and customer. Here there are some examples of how a real time: price is 
generated. 
This example is an experiment of scheduling electric thermal storage systems by real time 
pri,cing [I, 101. The experiment was carried out in New York Power Plant. The project 
usled an open loop feed-forward control. The storage charging schedule:; were set for each 
site, and after few hours, site data were analyzed automatically in view of new information 
and a new schedule was determined and set to the site, over- riding the previous schedule. 
The control algorithm was composed of two stages. The first stage assumed that the load 
and the day- ahead price forecasts were accurate, and determined as optimal storage 
charging schedule under deterministic conditions. A second stage considlered the 
inaccuracy in the future load and price forecasts, and modified the charging schedule by a 
heuristic based stochastic algorithm using the hour- ahead prices and the: measured current 
talk temperature. This is shown in figure 1.4. 
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Deterministic 
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Figure 1.4. Elements of the RTP Based Control System 
The existing systems handled delivery of heat to the building from the stlorage tank, while 
the RTP system controlled the timing of electrical energy into the st0rag.e tank. Price and 
wt:ather information were gathered electronically, the building status was sensed, and a 
near- optimal storage charging schedule for the building was calculated imd activated. 
The hardware required for RTP control of the electric thermal storage unit were a 
computer, modems for communications, a data logger/ controller unit, and some sensor to 
measure the status of the HVAC. The control algorithms resided in the central computer 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. At each site, a data logger collected and stored data, and 
downloaded it to the central computer when called. The data loggers also monitored the 
storage tank and implemented the control schedule for the site. The central computer 
supervised and automatically implemented al the site data retrieval and storage, control 
computations, and site scheduling. It coordinated placing of calls to the sites, the weather 
sei-vice, and to a price file. The computer receives prices from the utility, and outdoor 
temperature forecasts from a commercial weather service company. The temperature 
foi-ecast information was combined with the site data to calculate a buildling load forecast 
foi- the next three days. The optimization programs determined the near- optimal storage 
charging schedules which were uploaded to the sites. 
The next example of generation and publication of prices shows some additional services 
foir the customer. Southern Co. and Mississippi Power Co. (MPC) installed an Automated 
Customer Information Project in order to develop closer ties to their cutstomers by 
offering flexible time- of- use, real- time pricing and interruptible rates, besides security, 
appliance control and easy access to metering information [ S ] .  Figure 1.5 shows the Utility 
Customer Network system (UCNet) used by these two companies. This system uses an 
Ericsson GE- Enhanced Digital Access Communications System to transmit and receive 
data and voice from the site of the customer to the utility customer network control 
center. The cost of the communication system is relatively low considering the capacity of 
transmitting data and voice, security features, networked communications, and broadcast 
capability. 
The UCNet Control Center controls the flow of data between the communication radio 
system and various applications. The Control Center is a controlling gateway to the radio 
system that allows computers running applications, such as remoter meter reading, load 
control and demand- side management applications, to communicate with meters and 
other en- use devices. The radio system can transmit and receive voice and high speed 
data up to 9600 baud's within 20 mile radius of the site. The node, rated for up to 300 V 
ac, contains both an Enhanced Digital Access Radio Communication and a CEBus power- 
line modem and is powered at application voltages on the secondary side of a distribution 
transformer. The CEBus is an open standard for communications to meter fiom multiple 
manufacturers and other devices like smart thermostats, dishwashers, remotely operated 
breakers and other consumer apparatus. The power- line modem in the node provides 
cornrnunications to all other CEBus devices along the secondary without additional 
wiring . 
lK:N& C~nttd Center km Industrial W r i n g  Interruptable Rates 
- - - - - - - -  ~ - m a  ~ U O I  and 
-\ ,wCEHus UN, - Demand Slde - -  A C 
Figure I. 5. Generation and transmission of price. 
At Mississippi Power Co. there are usually three to six customers on each secondary 
transformer with higher densities in some areas. By using CEBus power- line 
conmunications, the cost of the node is divided among several customer!; and serves to 
decrease the cost for each individual installation. 
1.3. Conclusions 
Alternative real time pricing includes many forms of pricing and each day appears a new 
one fiom the need of a better price for the supplier and the customer. The price that is 
given to customer is really a combination of one or more categorization of prices. 
Categorization of prices based on time and price gives the customer and supplier a tool to 
generate real time pricing. Other alternative real time infrastructures, besides those 
described in categorization of prices, are based on outage costs and dern~and. 
Th~e generation of prices not only include a basic categorization, but the relation of present 
and fbture constraints and the cost involved in the same generation and i:ransmission. 
Some examples of generation and transmission of prices were presented. Also, an example 
of controlling a thermal storage plant by real time pricing is an infrastructure that gives the 
supplier the alternative of reduce the operating costs and generate a bettler price for 
cu!;tomers. Generation of prices includes a high technology to gather data of variables in 
the: price calculation and to transmit these data to a central computer. Thle use of new 
equipment compatible with many home devices improve the speed of reading the 
corlsumption of energy and also gives additional services like security, in cases of device 
malfunction, and advanced information related to future outages. 
Table 1.1. SUMMARIES OF RA 
lutilitv l ~ a t e  Name l ~ a t e  Status 
(~eorgia Power !variable spot price IExperimental 
Company (rate one (VSP-1) I 
Georgia Power (supplemental (~pproved 
company l ~ n e b y  Rate I 
Pacific Gas and 1 Experimental Real ( Experimental 
Electric PGandE Time Pricin A-RTP 
Pacific Gas and Agricultural Optional 
Electric (PGandE) Interruptible (special 
condition of rate PA-  
Experimental1 
contract only 
Pacific Gas and 
Electric (PGandE) 
( ~ ~ r e e m e n t  I 







and Power (HLP) 
Houston Lighting 




TES IDENTIFIED IN SOME COMPANIES 
# customers (characterization 1 
&eriment 
lnterruptible Service 









-200 l ~ a i l y  update, hourly time unit; four tkr, marginal wstp I 
Optional to all 
customers above 
5000 kVA 
Available to small 
power producers anc 
cogenerators of 100 





from 50 to 60 I~ummer  peak period, hourly; marginal cost based with I 
Peak Activated Rate 
(Residential) 
Experimental (3- 
year trial completed) 
1 averagelmarginal cost 
200: estimate 600 in I Interruptible with customer ovemde. no advance wamina: 
industrial 
3 initially; increasing 
interrupt 
Daily update, hourly time unit; continuous 
1987 
3 IDaily update, hourly time unit; continuous, experimentalI 
price nbt marginal cost based 
New; estimate 200 
by 1988 
1 estimated future costs 
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Chapter I1 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Real Time Pricing 
P. 0. Asare 
11.11 Introduction 
Demand-side management (DSM) programs are designed to indluce modifications 
in utility customer behavior that confer benefits on both the customer and the system as a 
whole. Most DSM programs start with a system load modification objective, identlfjr one 
or ;several means of altering customer loads and then attempt to idenilf) the customers 
who might be able to provide individual load changes that will add iup to the desired 
sysi em load modi6cation [2]. 
In general, the utility has difEculty in establishing a stable, predictable connection 
between system conditions and needs, and DSM program responses [2]. Because utility 
conditions can vary sigmficantly from day to day or even fiom hour t1o hour, while the 
effect of DSM programs tends to be less variable, utilities may wanit to have several 
programs available to meet complex load shaping objectives. However, given the 
amkliguity in individual program response and the possibility for interactive effects among 
programs, a portfolio of DSM plans may be di£Ecult to manage toward specific objectives. 
Consequently, the concept of Real Time Pricing (RTP) of electricity was introduced to 
offset the problems enumerated. 
Real-time price is an electricity rate which varies with time in order to reflect the 
electric utility's time varying costs of generation, transmission, and distribution [I]. It 
helps to improve the economic efficiency of overall operation of the elecitric system. RTP 
can provide benefits to both the utility and the customers because it ir; a strategic tool 
which provides customers with the same type of cost and load management signals that 
are l~rovided to the electric supply system. It is a critical element in economically efficient 
leasl-cost strategies because it provides the customer with symmetric signals that 
encourage both reduction in consumption (high prices) and also increases in consumption 
encourage both reduction in consumption (high prices) and also increases in consumption 
(low prices). This characteristic of symmetry makes it a unique methocl relative to others 
in the field of conservation and load management because RTP can be used to dispatch the 
customers' load, not merely turn it off when and if required by the utility [I.]. In the 
pralcess of developing and. implementing least-cost strategies, RTP can .provide significant 
inc:remental benefits to existing demand-side as well as supply-side programs. 
XI.;! Real-time pricing of electricity 
Most electric utilities now have in place or intend to offer a wide variety of DSM 
programs aimed at the full range of utility customer groups and designed1 to produce many 
different kinds of customer responses. Many of these programs have achieved their limited 
load-shaping objectives [2]. However, collectively DSM programs face a dilemma which 
arises fiom the tradeoffs among conflicting objectives. Despite the large number of 
programs available, utilities cannot establish a unique match between their load 
management goals and their customers' responses to the DSM incentives [2] .  It is ofien 
dacul t  to predict the degree and timing of load response that will resull. fiom a program. 
Sonie programs will provide beneficial results at predictable and desiral~le times but lead 
to t:xtraneous behavior that is undesirable for the system at other timc:s. For example, 
incentives to reduce daytime use of air conditioners result in less total usage over the daily 
cycle. However, customers may respond by increasing usage at the. peak under the 
influence of low energy cost. 
Real-time pricing of electricity is a relatively new concept in rate design that is 
currently being employed by several utilities across the country on an experimental basis. 
Although methods of RTP implementation vary, the basic concept is to plrice electricity to 
reflect the actual cost of providing energy at a given point in time. Therefore, a real-time 
rate communicates to customers the actual cost of delivering energy as ;it is used. Given 
this information, efficiency gains may be realized as customers are provided the 
opportunity to control their electricity bills by adjusting their conmq~tion to spot price 
va~iations. 
An RTP rate is typically calculated as a cents per kilowatt-hour charge that is 
comprised of both a short-run marginal energy cost component as well as a marginal 
caplacity component [I]. A different rate for each hour of each day is calculated and 
provided to customers with enough advance notice to allow them to change their energy 
consumption accordingly. When adapting this RTP method to an individual utility, it is 
possible to r e h e  the approach to make the process easier to understand and to administer. 
A real-time price is an energy-only rate that tracks the short-run-marginal-cost 
(SP'MC) of delivering electricity during a specific time and at a specific location [I]. 
When employed by a regulated utility obligated to serve all of its cilstomers, RTP is 
adjusted for kll recovery of allowed revenues. SRMC includes marginal costs that are 
brought about by the last KWh demanded by a customer. Costs reflect real and reactive 
energy, operation and maintenance, reserve requirements, maintenance of frequency, 
voltage and other parameters within tolerance [I]. Also reflected in the costs are 
reliiibility contingency planning related operations and capacity shortage. 
Real-time prices are calculated either retroactively or prospectively. When 
calculated retroactively, they are based on accounting/lustorical data for analysis 
purposes. Information on an hourly system lambda, power losses, and instances of 
capiicity shortage is usually available for the preceding few years [I]. RTP rates can also 
be calculated prospectively as a forecast or expectation or expectation, based upon the 
knowledge available at the time of the forecast about the likely state of the system at the 
time the RTP will be in effect. Forecasts can be short term (i.e. hours to minutes in 
advimce) or long term (i.e. months to years in advance). The longer the forecast, the 
larglcr the forecast error and the associated risk premium. Forecasts are obtainable from 
existing state of the art computer codes such as unit-commitment/short-term-transaction- 
evaluation software, and production cost simulation software. 
The rates for RTP are generally designed to be electronically communicated to 
customers ahead of the fact. Systems available at present communicate either an hourly 
prilse a day ahead (24 hour look ahead basis), or provide a forecast of the next day's 
hoirrly cost and a firm price for the next hour 20 minutes ahead of the hour. Recording 
meters are used to keep track of the actual level of consumption during all hours. For 
systems in which the customer controls the load, as opposed to those in which specific 
loads are controlled by a computer logic, a print out and/or electror~ic display is also 
pravided. 
By developing pricing systems based on the short-run marginal cost of utility 
optxations, RTP takes the existing, economically efficient scheduling signals presently 
used by the utility industry and extends them to the customer. In so dohg RTP focuses on 
incl-easing the overall efficiency of operation of the power system. From the perspective 
of lhe customer, it provides the information necessary to develop economically rational 
strategies for electricity usage. Customers can schedule major loads so as to reduce cost 
and maximize net benefits. As a result, RTP provides a program enhancement device for 
customers and for the utility. Existing investment and/or programs involving customer 
response for peak demand reduction, in response to high demand charges or high peak 
time of use (TOU) rates, for instance, are now more flexible fiom the perspective of the 
customer. Thus, RTP provides information upon which the load can be scheduled based 
on the need of both the customer and the utility. The customer is provided with the 
infarmation needed to reduce demand when it is cost effective to do so and to increase 
denland when it is economically the most attractive. 
RTP is not only symmetric in terms of customer load reduction and customer load 
increases. It is also symmetric with respect to the customer and the utility. Customer cost 
savjngs are precisely matched by the reductions in the operational cost of the utility [I]. 
The response to RTP therefore, unlike the response to either TOU or demand charges, 
provides either load reduction or load building at the time and at the currlznt cost of supply 
of electricity. The question is not whether there will be a least integrated uthty/customer 
cod strategy developed, but rather how these benefits will be shared between the utility 
and the customer. 
II.;3 Advantages of real time pricing 
There are numerous potential benefits to be derived fiom the real time pricing of 
electricity. A number of these benefits are listed and briefly discussed in this section. 
One of the biggest advantages of RTP is the reduction of the n.eed for additional 
peaking capacity. Capital expenditure for generation expansion is often enormous and 
RTP helps to take off some of that burden. At times of low system reliability, 
considerable benefits are obtained fiom customers who fhd ways to reduce load, thereby 
helping to avoid forced outages. Through the reduction in energy use by customers at 
sysrlem peak and increase of use during off-peak times, the load factor is considerably 
improved. 
Real-time pricing removes the monthly demand charge and limits the high cost of 
senice hours to a relatively few hours during a year [I]. This may provide customers with 
inc1,eased flexibility and choice in their consumption pattern without necessarily increasing 
their electricity bill. In the absence of RTP, if a customer had high demands even for only 
a few hours in a month, they had to pay the penalty for the entire month. RTP provides 
equitable billing without cross subsidies or discrimination among customers. It reflects 
each customer's impact on its cost of service. Customers are provided with information 
that allows them to potentially alter their consumption pattern and decrease their 
electricity costs relative to the value of service to them. RTP gives customers the 
incentives for altering their consumption patterns in the direction of lower service costs. 
Thus short and long term prospects for lower cost service are realized. 
Nuclear generation units are diflicult to operate at less than 111 output [4]. Once 
the energy is produced it has to be used since it is also di£Ecult to recycle. RTP helps to 
minimize these problems since the power is often available at low nlarginal cost and 
therefore customers are induced to buy. The utilities in the process havle the opportunity 
to nlake high profit margin sales. 
Deregulation of the utility industry has opened the door for indeptmdent generation 
of power by large industrial and commercial customers. Competition in the industry, 
which was almost non-existent before, does put some utilities who cannot offer 
co~npetitive prices for their power at risk of losing customers. RTP helps these utilities to 
offer reasonable prices to their customers, and thereby discourages them fiom buying 
power form other companies, or generating their own power in some cases. 
RTP helps to increase the overall efficiency of electricity generation and 
consumption. Overall system reliability is also increased due to availability of excess 
capacity. Marginal outage costs convey information about customers' willingness to pay 
for reductions in system reliability. Outage charges depend on energy reserve conditions. 
Using real time pricing mechanisms, ample energy reserves, and hence high system 
reliability, can be maintained. Therefore, in the majority of hours the outage charge is 
zero or very small. 
In some areas the &el sources available for generation are delpleting and it has 
become necessary to adopt conservation measures. Some customers in certain cases go 
through rotational outages as a means of helping to conserve energy. In helping to reduce 
the need for generation expansion, RTP aids in the conservation of these: depleting natural 
resources. 
11.4 Illustration of customer response to RTP 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) created the IIourly Integrated 
Pricing Program (HtPP) to determine experimentally whether real-time pricing can 
provide the appropriate customer response at precisely the time it is required. By basing 
electric service pricing on short-run marginal cost, NMPC wanted to see if it could 
achieve efficient restructuring of usage patterns under equitable revenue reconciliation 
arrangements. The HlPP is a form of RTP but is unique among other pricing programs in 
two ways. First, it includes a true experimental control group that supports comparative 
response analysis. Second, customers face hourly energy prices based on marginal cost 
with no revenue reconciliation factor. 
The Hourly Integrated Pricing Program was initiated in 19:B7. It offers an 
experimental rate to a limited number of customers who were selected to be representative 
of l\SMPCYs large industriallcommercial service class. This class is served by a time-of-use 
rate As part of the experimental design, customers were subscribed to HlPP in two 
phases to permit the second phase of volunteers to serve as a control gralup for the first. 
HIPP customers are diverse and have a variety of electric load shapes [2]. They 
include paper mills, heavy manufacturing, a brewery, municipal wastewater treatment 
pliuits and university campuses. They are regionally diverse as well, spread across Niagara 
Mohawk's service territory fiom Albany to Buffalo. Customer size varies from about 2 
l W V  to over 30 MW, with an average demand in excess of 6 MW. Usage ranges fiom 15 
to '187 million kWh per year, with an average of 50 million kWh per year. As a class, 
HII'P customers constitute about 2.5 percent of NMPC's total electric revenues [2]. 
HPP customers receive notification of hourly prices by 4:00 p.m.. of the preceding 
business day. Customers then make decisions on the pattern of their e1e:ctricity use based 
on :these prices. HIPP is a DSM program because it provides an inducement to m o w  
loacl in a manner desired by the utility. What sets HlPP apart from other DSM programs 
is that the inducement is a price signal tied directly to time-differentiatetl system marginal 
cost, and therefore assures that any customer response benefits the customer, the utility 
and nonparticipants [2]. 
The inducement varies on an hour-by-hour basis. It signals the potential for load 
building at times of high system reliability and encourages conservation at times of low 
relia~bility. The system's status is indicated by means of marginal costs composed of two 
segments: marginal energy and marginal outage costs. Marginal energy costs are derived 
from the cost of generating or purchasing and then transmitting and dilaributing electric 
power to customers. Marginal outage costs estimate the value of losses to system 
customers arising fiom an outage, based on the probability of the next kWh consumed 
protlucing an outage and the cost of the outage. Shown in Table 1 is a\ summary of the 
retajd prices paid by HPP customers since the program started in April 1988. Prices 
reflect the seasonal nature of system reliability, with prices generally higlher in winter and 
surmer than in spring and fill. NMPC experienced temporary capacity shortages in early 
1989 and the high prices of electricity shown in the table for that period reflect that 
situation. HTPP prices have average values similar to the usage chirrges of NMPC's 
industrial time-of-use rate, but they have even highly variable, especially at times of low 
system reliability. 
Table (11.1). HTPP prices compared to standard TOU prices ($/MWh) [2] 
Note: On-peak and off-peak periods are defined by NMPC's TOU rate. On-peak: t1:00 a.m.-1O:OO p.m. 
on all non-holiday weekdays. Off-peak: all other hours. 
1 These are the prices for service under the company's large industrial service time of use service 
clasr:ification, SC-3A. All HIPP customers converted from SC-3A to HIPP and revenue neutrality under 
HIPI' is defined in terms of embedded cost allocations for that class. 
2 Pric:e is an average of rates charged to the first 9 customers joining HIPP. 
Niagara Mohawk's HIPP rate provides a clear signal directly to customers, of 
conditions within the system. This signal is their sole inducement to engage in load- 
mock@mg behavior. If such load modifications occur, they are unambi~wously beneficial 
to the utility and to other customers connected to the system The basis of the HlPP is the 
pricl3 signal based on day-ahead forecasts of marginal cost. HlPP is unlike other real-time 
ratel3 in that retail price is set equal to short run marginal cost and contains no additive or 
mul1:iplicative factor for revenue recovery [2]. Instead, the rate is based on two-part 
pricing theory. The k s t  part is an energy charge, consisting of marginal. cost on an hourly 
basis, adjusted for transmission losses and taxes. The second component is a lump sum 
"access charge," a unique feature that assures customer-specific revalue neutrality and 
Illills the overall revenue requirement. 
The access charge is a fee, paid monthly, and set such that the customer's HlPP 
bill exactly equals the TOU bill that the customer would have paid had they remained on 
thai; rate and maintained the level of usage established by the "custonier baseline l oad  
(CHL). The CBL consists of an 8,760 hour load profile established ;by each customer 
during the July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1987 period. These loads are conformed to the current 
calcndar to match days of the week in the base year to those in the current year, thereby 
taking into account the need to align weekdays, holidays and shutdowns. Thus, the access 
charge is derived from a bill calculation based on actual HIPP prices, TOU prices and 
basc:line load and it equates TOU and HIPP bills at baseline load. :Each customer is 
therefore revenue neutral at his baseline load, with revenue neutrality d~zfined in terms of 
historical usage. In practice this means that the customer effectively pays the real-time 
price (short run marginal cost) on incremental load above CBL in each hour. In addition, 
decirements in load below CBL credit the customer's bill at the same real-time price. 
Strategic load growth is desirable to the utility at times of high system reliability. 
Such growth distributes embedded costs over a larger load base, thereby reducing rates. 
A PbSM program with this objective seeks to induce customers to increase usage when 
energy is available with plenty of reserve margin. Generally this occur:s during off-peak 
periods as defined by system marginal costs. 
HIPP customers engaged in signi£icant strategic load growth, as indicated by the 
results shown in Table (II.2). The table compares Phase 1 customers' load growth in the 
lowest priced hours with growth during the entire first year of the program. During the 25 
1owc:st priced days of the year, HIPP customers increased consumption by 3.7 million 
kWl1 or 11.69 percent, while loads increased by 12.7 million kwh or only 2.87 percent 
during the entire year. This pattern of load growth at low prices is evident in the quarterly 
breakdown as well, with growth during the lowest priced h e  days outperforming the 
entire quarter. Only the high priced first quarter of 1989 showed little difference in the 
rate of load growth. 
Table (II.2). HIPP energy usage: low priced and high priced days vs:. all days [2] 
Lowest priced 
days; in quarter 
25 ls~west priced 
dayc: overall 
Highest priced 
days: in quarter 
25 highest pri- 
ced ~ h y s  overall 
All days quar- 
terly summary 
All clays total 
Average 
HIPP price 
( S r n h )  
CBL 
Strategic load growth is also evident in the pattern of load shape changes in 
periods of low prices. One such period was April 1988. Figure (11.1) depicts the pattern 
of actual and baseline usage by the average Phase 1 HIPP customer on weekdays during 




Average loads increased in every hour, but increased more strongly during on-peak hours 
(in the TOU sense) than in the off-peak period. Thus, the TOU rate was suppressing 
demand during periods when there was no cost-based reason for doing so. 
Average hourly loads - weekdays 
Hour of day 
Average hourly prices - weekdays 
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I I I 1 I I I I I - 
1 3 5 7 0 11 13 15 17 19 n 
Hour of day 
Figure (II.1). Average phase 1 HlPP customer (April 1988) [2] 
Table (II.2) shows that in the year's 25 most expensive d ~ y s  Phase 1 HlPP 
customers reduced loads by 4.47%, in contrast to the 2.87% load growth registered 
du~ing the 111 year. The contrast between the 25 highest and lowest priced days is even 
greater, a difference of over 16 percent. 
Figure (II. 2) demonstrates the effectiveness of marginal cost -based pricing in 
helping to reduce peak use. It illustrates HIPP prices and the baseline and actual loads of 
a EIIPP customer on August 3, 1988, which happens to have been the summer system 
peak. Knowing that prices were going to be high for the day, the custolmer reduced load 
sigtdicantly below baseline, especially between 6:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. The largest load 
reduction in any hour was about 80 percent. Although the customer did not sustain this 
degree of reduction throughout the day, it provided some load relief in every hour of high 
prices. HIPP customers responded with sipdicant reductions below their baseline use 
whcnever HlPP prices were high; the degree of response increased with real-time price. 
Consider the hour of highest HIPP prices to date, shown in Table (II.3), for March 8, 
1989. In both this hour and the August 4 summer price peak shown in Table (II.3), HlPP 
cusiomers reduced usage by approximately 35% in response to strong marginal price 
sign als. 
Table (II.3). H P P  price peak [2] 
:Peak hour I HIPPprice I usage (MWh) 
Spring peak 
l'uesday, 
h4arch 08 08 
S'ummer peak 
'I'hursday, 
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Figure (II. 2). Strategic conservation (August 3, 1988) [Z] 
Another look at Table (II.2) c o w  that this is neither a phenomenon restricted to the 
most expensive hours nor a chance event. In the 25 days (or 600 hc)urs) of highest 
average price during the f ist  year of HlPP s e ~ c e ,  customers reduced load by 
approximately 1,323 MWh or 2.2 MW per hour. This translates into about 25 MW in 
each hour for the average HIPP customer. 
The responses by J3PP customers to the experiment indicates that they are able to 
respond to day-ahead marginal cost-based pricing. By taking advantage of price 
differentials over time, they have produced s i m c a n t  DSM benefits for the Niagara 
Mohawk system and its customers. Furthermore, the value of these benefits appears to 
increase with the size of the price signal. This is especially evident in hours of HlPP price 
peaks, when HlPP customers provided significant load relief to the system. 
I.! Potential drawbacks of RTP 
Despite the numerous potential benefits that can be derived fiom spot pricing of 
electricity, there are some disadvantages associated with it. One major ]problem with spot 
pricing is the expensive equipment needed to provide the pricing signals to customers. In 
some cases they may be difficult to install, and additional expenditure would have to be 
made for the purpose of educating customers on their use. 
Under real-time pricing, the consumption behavior of every utility customer may 
affect the prices faced by all other consumers [3]. Through consumpti~on behavior, each 
utility customer can affect marginal generation costs (which are non-linearly related to 
denmd), pollution emissions, and the quality attributes of electricity (harmonic distortion, 
frequency, etc.). Each customer can also affect the balance between denmd and available 
cap,scity for power generation, transmission, and distribution. This is the so-called 
"obnoxious" neighbor problem. 
The problem can be illustrated by a case of two price-inelastic customers served 
thraugh a radial transmission line. If' both customers have equal annual consumption, but 
customer A's demand for electricity fluctuates very little (A has a high load factor), while 
cust omer B 's demand is very volatile, then customer A may be adversely affected by B's 
con!sumption behavior. Assume that the transmission or distribution line serving the two 
customers has a capacity which is adequate to serve the combined average demand of the 
two customers, but is inadequate to accommodate loads which are 'higher than their 
combined average demand. In this case, no transmission congestion charges will be 
assessed on either customer as long as B's demand remains at or below its average level. 
However, a transmission congestion premium will be charged to both customers A and B 
whenever B's demand is higher than average. In a sense, customer A is paying part of the 
cost associated with customer B's demand volatility. 
Another problem (and one which is by no means unique to a real-time pricing 
system) involves the state of the system and network [3]. Every location in the network 
enjoys a Werent status. Greater transmission and distribution system capacity will be 
available in some locations in the network than in others. Some customers will face the 
"oklnoxious" neighbor problem. The age and efficiency of the utility system equipment 
will W e r  among various geographical locations in the network. The state of the system at 
a particular customer's location will affect the prices that the custorner will face. A 
customer in a slow growth area, an area where growth expectations did inot materialize, or 
an area with relatively newer facilities will likely face lower prices than a customer in an 
areii where congestion charges or other premiums must be frequently applied to ration 
available supply. 
Power wheeling may put merent customers in a power pool at a comparative 
advantage or disadvantage. For a simplified "bus to bus" wheeling transaction, the 
optimal wheeling price (to be paid to the wheeling utility) is the merence in optimal 
prices between the two locations [5]. Consummation of the wheeling transaction may 
affect the optimal prices at every other location of the network. The change in power 
flovis throughout the network will cause the optimal prices faced by some consumers to 
increase and will reduce prices to others. If the party desiring the whieeling transaction 
were required to compensate all customers whose welfare were inadvertently affected by 
the transaction, then incorrect price signals might be sent. 
Theoretically, the premiums and charges collected through real-time pricing are 
expc:cted to be used toward alleviating the constraint that prompted their assessment. For 
exnnple, the utility revenues collected through pollution emissions premiums would be 
dedjcated toward pollution abatement. However, ensuring that the revenues collected 
through premiums and charges are actually dedicated toward such investments may prove 
difEcult due to indivisibilities and other factors. For example, it may be ciifllcult to ensure 
that the revenues collected in one region of the network are not used to excess~ely 
subsidize ratepayers in other locations. Inevitably, it will be necessary to use some 
revenues fiom current ratepayers to construct facilities for future ratepayers. 
In an area where there is a majority of customers whose demand for electricity is 
price-inelastic, spot pricing of electricity may lose its effectiveness. This is because there 
will be no incentive for these customers to either reduce consumption during system peak 
hours, or to increase consumption to take advantage of low energy prices during off-peak 
hours. 
11.6 Summary 
In an era when there is immense pressure fiom government regulatory agencies 
and environmental groups on utility companies to find new ways of cons~xving natural &el 
resources, RTP has become a tool of utmost importance. Real-time piricing provides an 
economically efficient means of incorporating existing electric utility supply-side least-cost 
power strategies onto the customer side of the meter. RTP provides the utility with a 
meilns of communicating information to the customer that can be used by the customer to 
plan and operate hisher facility so as to minimize cost or maximize output while I l ly  
compensating the utility for the costs of service. As such, RTP provides additional 
benl2fits to the operation of existing customer side investments andlor prlograms as well as 
providing incentives for new programmatic investments. Because the system is symmetric 
to the customer, it encourages reduction in demand when prices are hip, and increase in 
denland when they are low. Also, because it is symmetric between tlie utility and the 
customer, it provides the basis for development and operation of least-cost strategies 
within the integrated system that includes both supply and demand side of the electric 
pow7er industry. 
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Chapter 111 
Advantages of Real Time Pricing 
for Electric Power Utilities 
III:.1 Int roduction 
The demand for electric power grows every day, but the construction of new generation 
facilities and new transmission lines has been delayed by energy, environment, right-of- 
way, and cost problems. The utilities rely on the utilization of power import/export 
arrangements to solve this problem. But the demand in a system is not always a constant 
hig,h level; the load duration curve has peaks and valleys [2], as can be observed in figure 
(IIX.1) . The peaks occur for some periods during the day. Nevertheless, the power 
sys tem is designed to meet the peak demand plus a reserve margin for reliability purposes. 
Time (hours) 
r e  ( 1 . 1  : Load Duration Curve for a 24-hour period 
Since the demand increases, but the number of generation plants d~o not, it is highly 
desirable to use existing facilities as efficiently as possible. If the demand curve is 
modified, the efficiency of the system would improve. 
Most utilities have some kind of program in which the customers agree to limit their loads 
in :return for a special rate [3] .  The main objective of these programs is to modify the load 
to achieve one of the following responses from the consumers: Clonservation, load 
shifting, peak clipping, valley filling, and load growth [I]. Examples. of these Demand 
Side Management (DSM) programs are the electric thermal storage, and the operation 
during off-peak hours. But the response of the customers to DSM incentives does not 
always match the load management goals established by the utilities. 
Re'al Time Pricing (RTP) seems to be a way of inducing modifications; in the customers' 
use: of energy at times needed by the utility company. The basic idea of RTP is to vary 
prices during the day, and informing those prices to the customers. Uncler a constant rate, 
a customer may rise the load at any time, without any effect to his operation. But if prices 
vary, the customers will be more cautious about when to increase their use of energy. 
In this chapter, Real Time Pricing schemes will be described. Then, the advantages of 
RTP programs to electric power utilities will be discussed. Finally, at novel method to 
cor~trol oad frequency using RTP will be presented. 
IIL,2 Real Time Pricing 
Real Time Pricing (RTP) is a service in which prices vary over time, based on projected 
supply and demand conditions. The electric utility calculates time differentiated prices, and 
conmunicates these control signals to the customers. The main objective of RTP is to 
build load when the system is in off-peak periods, and to shift load from peak hours. This 
represents a valuable tool for utilities wanting to achieve control of their loads. 
Another motivation for RTP is to increase the services available to customers. RTP 
benefits the customers because they can buy cheaper power at low-priced periods, or 
diminish their use of energy at high cost intervals. RTP tariffs also make an utility more 
attractive to customers. This is headed to combat cogeneration. Custorr~ers may consider 
to construct private generation facilities due to the utilities lack of diversity in the rates. 
R'IT can also be used by the elecmc utilities to hold off further pressure from regulatory 
bases as the Public Utility Commission. 
The rates in RTP have characteristics in time and price domains [4]. These characteristics 
determine the intervals in which time differentiated prices will become available to the 
customer. Figure 1311.2) shows the divisions in the time domain. The updated cycle is the 
length of time that a rate is valid. The time unit is the number of separated prices that are 
qucwed within an updated cycle. The advanced warning is the time the customers have to 
adjust to a new rate. An update cycle of minutes is used by the utilities just for economic 
dispatch, and for power interchange with other companies. The weekly and monthly 
cycles are usually used for maintenance and refueling purposes. The most common update 
cycle used for RTP is a daily interval. For example, prices for tomorrow are calculated 
tod.ay, and the number of prices depends on the time unit chosen. The customers have 
access to the prices of tomorrow as early as 12 hours in advance, (depending on the 
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Figure (111.2) : Real Time Pricing Time Divisio~ns 
In the price domain, the most important property is the extent to whiclh price models the 
short run marginal cost. Calculation of the price includes the operating cost, the system 
co!it, and the cost for the network. There are other methods to determine price, one method 
usc: the average costs rather than the marginal costs to determine the ra.te. In the demand 
chiuge method, the customer is billed for the excess in consumption of a pre-specified level 
of power. Another method uses just the operating cost to set the prices. There are also 
price increments, levels in which prices are set. These are the prices whiich are available to 
cu!itomers. 
There are other approaches to set RTP rates. One alternative approach accounts for 
coxisumer respond to the prices, as well as  the impact of their respond to system costs and 
capacity [5]. Other method includes capital costs in the RTP rate determination [6]. All 
these approaches point into the same direction: The use of time and cost of energy to 
develop new rate structures. The choice of which rate to use depends 011 the specific need 
of the utility. 
Real time pricing programs are currently at an experimental phase. RTP is an area of 
intense research, and new concepts are being studied. There is a belief that customers 
cannot adapt to real time prices. Nevertheless, customers have responded in a positive way 
to such rate diversification efforts. The Niagara Mohawk program is, an example of a 
successful implementation of an RTP program [I]. In this program, !he utility had the 
opportunity to deal with the experimental and a control group. 'This was a great 
opportunity to measure first hand, the success of the program. RTP ideas; are not limited to 
the United States. There are also RTP-like programs in Canada, Sweden, France, 
Australia, United Kingdom, and Finland. 
As can be deduce from the discussion above, there are many types of RTP programs. 
Therefore, the implementation of time differentiated rates depends upon the type of 
customer, and the electric utility providing the service. Hardware diffic:ulties is the main 
constraint for RTP programs. These include the equipment used for control and 
conununication of the price signals. Such problems have forced the cancellation of some 
prosgrams because the requirements of customers and utilities were not met [4]. In the 
other hand, some industries cannot start RTP programs because of the nature of their 
businesses. RTP offers a wide variety of markets because it is not limited to industries. 
For example, there are RTP residential programs in Georgia [4]. Obviously, 
implementation of RTP is more complex in this case because of the qualntity of customers 
in\rolved. 
I11.3 Real Time Pricing and the Electric Utilities 
The major challenge of any Demand Side Management program is to match the needs of the 
util.ities to the response of the customers to such program. Real Time Pricing achieves this 
objective by varying the service rate during the day, announcing periods for load building 
at times of high system reliability, and encouraging conservation during times of low 
reliability. In many situations, a program that encourages load growth does not contribute 
to conservation of energy. But an RTP scheme may accomplish both conservation and 
growth of load. Thus, RTP is an effective load management tool for the electric utilities. 
Another advantage of the use of RTP is in the generation reserve. By achieving greater 
ability to transfer the system load from peak to off-peak periods, the generation reserve 
mqy be increased. This will also help improve the reliability of the system, because more 
resources would be available to meet the demand in case of an emergency situation. It is 
the scale of response and adaptability to the full range of utility reserve situations that 
makes RTP an important tool. 
RTP rates can also increase utility revenues, and lead to a more efficiient use of power 
supply and delivery systems. If the peak demand of a system is diminished, construction 
of new generation facilities is delayed. Shifting the peak demand results in a flatter load 
duration curve, which increases system efficiency. For example, instead of running the 
sys1;em at 85% for 2 hours (peak period), and at 65% the rest of the time, the system may 
operate at 75% all the time. Obviously, this increases efficiency and profits. 
RTI? rates may help electric utilities to keep market share. Innovative rates may enable 
utilities to be more responsive to customer needs. RTP offers flexibility to the customers 
by giving another option for operating decisions and planning. This wiay, the customers 
become more competitive, and attractive to their own clients. Providing better service to 
cusl:omers, the utilities remain in a better position than other options the customers may 
consider (e.g. private generation). In the Niagara Mohawk experiment, customers bought 
mare power than the power baseline originally contracted [I]. In this case, RTP rates 
improved the revenues of the utility. 
Another area in which RTP rates may be used is in the pricing of reactive power reactive 
poTwer. The pricing of reactive power has received little attention. :Nowadays, power 
factor penalties are the common way of "pricing" reactive power. But power factor 
pelidties are not always the most adequate reactive power pricing policy. Real time prices 
can be applied to reactive power using a modification of the optimal power flow model [7]. 
Under such scheme, VARs would be treated as another electricity market. commodity. 
Information gathered through RTP programs is used for resource planning and operation of 
a power system. In system planning studies, construction of new facilities and allocation 
of (available resources are directly affected by an RTP program. In system operation, RTP 
brings another tool for the technicians when emergency situations arise. 
RTP programs can be kept administratively simple. An agreement is reached with the 
customer in terms of the power baseline to be used during the year. The rest of the 
prclgram implementation is  based upon existing processes. RTP is  just added to the 
existing tariffs available to customers. 
Re8al Time Pricing extends the time-of-use (TOU) rate concept by inmasing the number of 
costing periods, and shortening the lead time for setting the rates. TOU rates may suppress 
demand during periods when there is  no cost-based reason to do so. In the other hand, 
RTP fosters conservation or load growth whenever the utility needs either response. 
111.4 Use of RTP in Load Frequency Control 
When the demand in a system increases, there is a decrease in system frequency until the 
generation may be increased to meet the load. This frequency deviatilon occurs because 
sorne of the load increase is met using the inertia of the rotating devilces in the system. 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is used to keep the frequency ilnd tie line power 
flows at their proper values [8]. But the response of AGC to a sudden load increase is not 
instantaneous. The frequency still deviates from the desired value until AGC detects the 
anomaly, and initiates a control action. A methodology for the control of load frequency 
anti tie line deviations has been presented. This method uses real time pricing as a control 
mechanism [9]. 
Spot pricing of electricity neglects the effects of power system dynamics involving 
frequency or voltage. Only Kirchoff s laws for network flow are consiclered. The authors 
in reference [9] discuss pricing on time the time scale of seconds to control frequency 
deviations. They assume that the technology to monitor real time prices is available, and 
operating at loads and generators. These devices react to time varying prices. The 
response to price is pre-set by the user. The computation time is assumed to be zero. 
The objective of pricing policy is to maximize social welfare. In other urords, to maximize 
consumers' plus producers' surplus, subject to the operational constrain~ts. The problem is 
to find the price at which the loads and generators would respond iin such a way that 
fi-equency and tie line deviations are controlled. 
The authors showed that the price for generation, and the difference in price between areas 
satisfy differential equations that are driven by penalty functions for frecquency and tie line 
deviations. Working on the assumption that the utility knows the optimiil conmls to solve 
the: social welfare problem, they reached a balance between utilities' profits and social 
welfare (in terms of electricity pricing). Under this correlation, they showed that the price 
of electricity is determined by the concern on frequency deviation. If frequency deviation 
dicl not matter, there would be a free source energy. This would mean drat there is infinite 
stored energy in the generators. For a detailed mathematical development, refer to [9]. 
To overcome the time that would be spent by transmitting the real time price, the control 
devices in private generators could detect the frequency deviation. Operating on the 
principle that an increase on frequency deviation implies an increase in electricity price, the 
private generators would increase their own generation to help reduce tlhe deviation. This 
eliiminates the problem of how the utility could compute and transmit the price faster than 
the. phenomenon to be conmlled. For further information on non-utility generated elecmc 
power, refer to [lo]. 
In terms of the demand, a control device at the loads would automatically monitor price, 
anti at times pre-set by the customer, turn the load on or off. For example, consider a 
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Figure (111.4) : Deviation in Mechanical Power of Utility Plants 
system with demand = 0.7 pu, and with 10% of its customers in RTP. Flor a step increase 
in d'emand equal to 0.05 pu, the demand would be equal to: 
D(t) = 0.05 - 0.07p(t) (III. 1) 
where p(t) is the deviation in price. 
Figures (III.3) and (III.4) are from Reference [9]. The difference in frequency deviation 
between a system response with RTP, and a system without RTP is shown in figure 
(III. 3). The panmeters involved in the system frequency control may be varied to achieve 
a better improvement in frequency deviation. The overshoot of mechanical power in figure 
(111 .4) was eliminated using RTP. Without pricing, this overshoot was necessary to bring 
frequency back to its set point. This action is shifted to the private genera.tors with pricing. 
Although there are many assumptions made in this method, the concept itself deserve 
further study as an alternative or complement to AGC. It also shows the diversity of 
applications that Real Time Pricing may have when implemented in a power system. 
111.5 Conclusions 
Real Time Pricing of electricity emerges as a Demand Side Management option to modify 
customers load at times needed by the electric utilities. RTP is therefore a tool to control 
system demand. The main objective of RTP is to build load during off-.peak periods, and 
to shift load from peak periods. This would make flatter the demand curve, which helps to 
im1)rove system efficiency. The reserve margin increases, reliability increases, and the 
ovtxall system efficiency increases. Shifting the peak demand results in a delay for the 
cor~struction of new generation facilities. 
RTP offers flexibility to the customers. It promotes customer service, and encourage 
customers to manage their load in a manner that leads to a more efficient use of power 
supply and delivery facilities. Diversifying the rates available to custoimers enhances the 
ability of the utility to provide solutions to daily customer service problerns. This keeps the 
utility attractive to customers, as compared to private generation. 
RTI' provides a load management tool for the utilities, and it may illso increase the 
revenues. By offering variable rates, the customers would be more lik~~ly to use energy 
during off-peak intervals. RTP programs would complement, maybe in a future substitute, 
existing pricing policies as the TOU rates. 
Altl~ough many companies cannot participate in RTP-like programs du'e to the nature of 
their products, those participating have expressed their satisfaction with ithe service. This, 
together with the advantages discussed above, make Real Time Pricing an attractive and 
feasible option for the electric power utilities. 
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(Open Access and its Issues) 
IV.1 Tntroduction 
- 
Since the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978 and the 
subsequent National Energy Policy Act (NEPA) in 1992 the electric power market, in 
principal, has gone from a regulated group of monopolies to a free, competitive market. 
Title VII of NEPA, which mandated changes in the structure of the electric power, 
industry came about after more than a decade of debate and is essentially based on 
economic theorizing rather than engineering design and experience [I]. This is basically 
surnmed up in the words of Richard E. Disbrow, Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer of American Electric Power Company, Inc., when he says, "One thing 
seems certain, that we have another lawyer's relief act [I]." 
This paper will give the reader a good overview of the idea of non-utility 
generation (NUG) and the ideas and problems associated with the concept of a 
co;mpetitively based electric power market. (Note that a NUG is sometimes referred to as 
an independent power producer (IPP) or, in some cases, as exempt wh~olesale generation 
(EWG). This paper will use the appropriate acronym as it fits within the context.) First 
thr: paper will give a brief history of utility regulation and how it has changed with PURPA 
and NEPA which have given way to what is commonly referred to as transmission open 
access (TOA) or, as it is sometimes referred to, open access (OA). Open Access can 
basically be broken down into two areas: (1) economic issues, and (2) operational issues. 
This paper will discuss both of these issues with respect to the current literature and will 
also contain sections for the following topics: wheeling of power, pricing methods, and 
security issues. The previously mentioned topics are by far the most prr:ssing issues facing 
utilities and IPPs. Since NEPA, the electric utility industry has been in a state of flux and 
will remain that way for sometime until these issues of operation and economics are solved 
or, at least, resolved with some degree of engineering design and legal jargon. 
IV.2 Utility Regulation 
-
Although utility regulation and open access issues are not limited to the United 
States, the focus of this this section will be on the past and present legislation concerning 
the power industry in the United States. It should be noted here that Perez-Arriaga, 
Rudnick, and Stadlin [2] give an excellent survey of international open access experiences 
from Europe, South America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. 
The electric utility industry began in the United States in 1882 when Thomas 
Edison commissioned the Pearl Street Station. This opened the door- to entrepreneurs 
who jumped at the opportunity to make a profit. One of the first major regulations passed 
was the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935. This act assigned franchised 
territories to power producers with the 't-esponsibility to serve" in return for the 
eliinination of competition. This not only prohibited utilities from piirticipating in any 
business except producing and distributing power for their customers but also barred 
NtJGs from the market. This act also empowered the Federal E.nergy Regulatory 
Cc~mmission (FERC) to set rates, terms, and conditions of access for power transferred 
between systems (wholesale wheeling). [3]. 
For many decades, the practice of wheeling was carried out through informal 
contracts between neighboring utilities which helped to ensure cooperative system 
planning. The utilities liked this form of being intertied, and it worked. However, in 1967 
the New York blackout occurred and the security of the electric transn~ission system was 
brought into the public spotlight. It was this incident that caused the federal government 
to create the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to help ensure a reliable 
electric transmission system in the United States. NERC used it's power to create nine 
regional reliability councils that were responsible for regional transmission planning. The 
purpose of these councils was not to create any super transmission 'higliways," but rather 
to make sure that the regional transmission system was correctly delsigned and could 
withstand first and second contingency failures without disastrous consequences. [3]. 
By the early 1970s, the traditional strength and stability of the mighty utility 
mc~nopolies was beginning to break down under political and economic forces which 
caused a once steady increase in load demand to come to an end. In addition, rising 
infl.ation, interest rates, and construction costs were causing many utilities to fall into 
financial crisis as their generation constructions plans were coming to completion but load 
demand was not on the increase. [4]. This, of course, caused energy rates to rise and 
su1)sequently be passed on to the utilities customer. The costs finally became such a 
bul-den to industrial production that something had to be done. As a reform, the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) was passed. This policy dictated that 
utilities give consideration to other sources of generation. PURPA, combined with a new 
emphasis on the environment, started a trend in energy conservation a.nd opened up the 
doors for IPPs (usually in the form of industrial co-generation) to enter the utility market. 
[3], [4]. According to the Electric Generation Association (EGA), an independent power 
producer trade association, this shift toward IPPs helped to stabilize and reduce costs from 
historic heights [4]. Yet, the success of PURPA, according to the E.GA, was that it's 
lirriitations were highlighted in practice. Under PURPA, utilities were only required to 
purchase from qualifiing co-generaters and small power producers (hereafter collectively 
ref'erred to as qualifjring facilities (QF)) at rates that are: (1) just and reasonable to the 
utility's customers and in the public interest, (2) non-discriminatory with respect to QFs, 
anld (3) not in excess of the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternate electric 
en'ergy [5]. The qualifications for being a QF, however, were still mandated by the 1935 
PIJHCA. However, QFs could avoid these mandates by meeting efficiency, thermal 
usage, and ownership criterion. If a QF met these conditions, a utility was required to 
purchase the QFs power. An interesting note, however, is that a utility may own up to 
50% of a QF project and currently there are more than 35 utilities actively participating in 
Ql; projects; many making very good returns. Despite the required complicated 
arrangements and approvals required to comply with PUHCA, IPPs did find ways to sell 
wholesale power under the reform of PURPA. [4]. 
It soon became clear that more reform was needed to build an effective 
coinpetitive market. On October 5, 1992 Congress passed Title VII, Subtitles A and B of 
the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act (NEPA). This policy dictated open access 
(OA) without regard to method, plan, or compensation [I], [3]. Put simply, FERC now 
has the authority to order wheeling and access. That is, any utility, federal power 
ma.rketing agency, or any other person generating electric energy for sale at wholesale may 
apply to FERC for an order that would require a transmitting utility to provide services to 
the applicant [I]. NEPA does not mandate that the order for access be issued, just that it 
be considered. Whenever FERC sees that the transaction would be in the best interest of 
the public, an order may be issued. Also, if FERC finds the transaction to be beneficial, 
yei: recognizes that the access may cause lack of security in the transmission system, they 
may order the wheeling utility to build additional transmission. [I]. Figure IV.1 gives the 
reader a rough time-line of major happenings in the electric utility industry. 
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Figure IV.l Time-line of Major Policies Affecting the 
Electric Utility Industry 
Currently, IPPs are gaining an increasing share of the power supply market and 
are now playing a significant role in the planning, development, and construction of new 
generation facilities in the United States. NEPA hrther opened the door for IPPs to enter 
the: wholesale power market as exempt wholesale generators (EWGs). This new breed of 
PI' is legislated by NEPA because of NEPA's allowance for open transmission access 
(wheeling) under the jurisdiction of FERC. [6]. It is important to understand that there 
are: two jurisdictions that exist in the U.S.; namely, federal and state. FERC is a federal 
entity and does not have the power to regulate state matters. NEPA specifically retains 
the states' right to regulate retail wheeling. The state utility comlnissions have the 
jurisdiction to make sure that the electric monopolies in their states are run for the benefit 
of the citizens of that state. They can accomplish this by controlling the rate of return 
which utilities earn and also by dictating whether a utility's investrn~ent is prudent or 
unwise. [3]. 
NEPA is no exception from the rule of red-tape and conhsion which usually 
co:mes from Washington. Like most legislation, NEPA is written in global terms and 
implementation is left to the interpretation of the affected administrativ'e agencies such as 
FE.RC and the state Public Service Commissions [I]. Ultimate:ly, however, the 
interpretation resides in the courts and no one can predict whether TOA and all the other 
aspects of the Act will benefit or hurt utilities and their customers with respect to 
reliability and the pricing of electric energy. 
It is, without a doubt, that California's Public Utility Comimission is on the 
forefront of seeing what can be done with the new found possibilities of a competitive 
power market. With a set of proposals released in April 1993, the California commission 
opened its networks to unprecedented competition in hopes of tying rate structures in with 
management-performance criterion [7]. The heart of the proposal is that of retail wheeling 
(a!; opposed to 'bulk" or wholesale wheeling). Retail wheeling (direct access) means that 
customers would be permitted to choose their own electricity suppliers. Not only does the 
California proposal include large commercial and industrial custoniers but also the 
individual residential customer. [7]. Recall, that NEPA was writtlen with regard to 
trslnsmission access, but transmission access can easily be seen to preclude retail wheeling 
[I], which was left up to the states to regulate. In addition to California's proposal, 
Michigan is another state that is taking advantage of NEPA. Both of these states will be 
discussed in the next section. 
W.3 Wheeling: 
- 
So far, several pages have been spent discussing what the major pieces of 
leg,islation concerning electric utilities has meant, does mean, and will mean. The term 
wheeling (both wholesale and retail) was mentioned on several occasions and especially in 
regard to NEPA. Wheeling is the heart of the operational and econon~ic issues of TOA 
ant1 thus deserves a separate treatment. Figure IV.2 is from Disbrow [I], and serves to 
co~nplement he discussion on wheeling. Arguably, wheeling is the most important issue 
of NEPA. 
In this description of wheeling, let the reader assume a 100 mV EWG desires to 
locate in utility A's service area and sell to utility B on the basis that utility A will supply 
transmission. Under NEPA, after the EWG applies for access, utility A has 60 days to 
determine the availability and pricing of the transmission. Example 1 of Figure IV.2 
shows a 'best-case" scenario. Here, long term transmission capacity is available so, all 
that remains is for utility A to determine the matter of pricing. Prior to NEPA, bilateral 
ag:reements were used to determine the pricing between adjoining utilities based on 
embedded costs that are subject to change over time. With the EWG in place, though, this 
plan can not work. Other factors come into play in the pricing. Things such as control 
area services, losses on the transmission system, lost opportunity costs (i.e., the loss of a 
transmitting utility's ability to sell it's own power because line loadings are too high due to 
third party transactions), generating reserve, etc. The combination of all these costs could 
well exceed the bare embedded costs of the transmission facilities alone. This increased 
cost could easily destroy the EWGs competitive prices and they would subsequently 
protest to FERC. FERC would then, if recent cases are indicative, base the pricing on 
either embedded or incremental construction costs. Therefore a utility may or may not 
recover all of its costs. 
Utility A Smice Area U!ility B Service Area 
Example 4 - The Prodical Son 
Utility A Smice A m  
Utility A Savice Area 
Figure IV.2 How Power Wheeling Works [I] 
Example 2 of Figure IV.2 shows the case when Utility A's transmission system can 
not adequately handle the proposed transaction. This may be because the extra loading 
may violate the utility's reliability standards or jeopardize the transmissic)n system security. 
In this case, eventhough the utility protests the request for access based on lack of 
transmission capability, FERC can still order access be allowed. If this happens, the 
reliability of the system could be greatly decreased or FERC could order utility A to 
cornstruct new transmission. The amount of time and capital outlay for new construction 
can be enormous, though. For instance, the last 765 kv line that American Electric Power 
Cclmpany constructed took almost 12 years to complete [I] .  Also, one always runs into 
the typical environmental, emf, and 'hot in my backyard" problems with ~:onstruction. So, 
who pays for the added cost? If utility A adds a 2000 MW line so that the EWGs 
transaction can be supported, does the EWG only pay 1/20th of the: cost? The state 
co:rnmission won't allow the cost to be passed on to the native load unless proof that the 
construction was in the best interest of the state can be shown. 
The 3rd example in Figure IV.2 is that of the so-called stranded investment. In 
this case, suppose that a municipality within utility A's area is the proposed customer of 
the EWG. Here, the EWG is selling to a wholesale customer of utility *4. Supposing that 
the municipality chooses not to purchase from utility A as it had in thle past, but instead 
chooses to buy power from the EWG. Utility A must still provide voltage and reactive 
power support and backup generation when the EWG is on either a forced or scheduled 
outage. Once again, the question of losses is prevalent here. Had the seller been another 
utility, the losses would be a part of the contract obligations. The st,r~nded investment 
comes from the fact that utility A had previously constructed generating facilities to supply 
the municipality. Now, in the presence of the EWG, the municipality neither uses nor pays 
for these facilities unless those costs are included in the transmission pricing. Thus the 
costs are spread out over the remaining native load which may or may not have need for 
those specific facilites. 
Of particular concern, in reference to stranded investments, are utilities with 
nurzlear facilities. These facilities are very costly and often lead to high utility rates for the 
cu!;tomers who are served by the nuclear plant. These customers would benefit the most 
from wheeling by leaving their native system and purchasing from an EWG. There is no 
device in place to deal with this issue. It is not even clear if this problem falls under the 
jurisdiction of FERC or that of the state commissions. [3]. 
Example 4 continues, in a way, that of the stranded investment. In this scenario, 
the: EWG finds a better transaction and thus discontinues service at the end of the fixed 
term with the municipality to sell its power elsewhere. Under the law, utility A is obligated 
to serve in exchange for its franchise area. Thus, even if there is a term contract with a 
customer, a utility can not terminate service even after the term. So. when the EWGs 
term agreement with the municipality expires, is utility A obligated to take the 'brodigal" 
back. If the answer is that utility A must take back the municipality on demand, then 
pla.nning processes become extremely complex. And from the municipalities standpoint, 
how is of long-term service assured and what are the responsibilities of the original and 
secondary suppliers? [I]. 
Although NEPA does not explicitly give rise to retail wheeling, as previously 
discussed, it does allow for the states to rule in that area. NEPA does, however, prohibit 
sham operations where a new wholesale purchasing entity is formed specifically for 
purchase and redistribution of energy to a utility's native load. [I], [3]. According to [3] 
and [7], things at the state level in both Michigan and California., may be moving 
significantly faster than anticipated to try out the new legislation. 
The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) has ordered a limited experiment 
for- 5 years to test the viability of retail wheeling. In this experiment, customers of either 
Detroit Edison or Consumers Power with a demand of more than 5 h W  can choose to 
purchase between 2 and 10 MW from other sources. No more than 90 MW of load for 
Detroit Edison and 60 MW for Consumers Power is to be affected by the experiment. 
This experiment hopes to define how retail wheeling will work. [3]. 
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The proposal issued by the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) is even 
mare significant [3]. The proposal claims that regulatory policy is "1) out of step and 
often in conflict with a changing, more competitive industry; 2) offers the utility at best 
weak incentives to operate and invest efficiently; 3) is composed of numerous, costly, and 
adininistratively burdensome proceedings; and, 4) creates unnecessary barriers to, and 
therefore threatens the quality of, public participation." [7]. Recall t'hat the California 
economy is suffering and the cost of doing business in California is ml~ch higher than in 
neighboring states. Many businesses are relocating and there is a push on the state 
government to encourage businesses to stay and new ones to start. [3]. 
The preamble to the CUPC's proposal stated that it was 'Single-minded in its 
ob-iective -- to lower the cost of electric service to California's residential and business 
coinsumers without sacrificing the utility's financial integrity." The (ZUPC's plan is a 
phased introduction of retail wheeling by introducing 'direct access to generation 
suppliers, marketers, brokers, and other service providers in the competitive marketplace 
for energy services." There are three phases: Phase one takes affect in 1996 and allows 
customers who take service at 50kV or higher to shop for more competitive electrical 
service; phase two takes affect in 1998 and will effect most commercia'l customers; phase 
three is implemented in 2002 and will carry this option to all customers. [3], [7]. 
IV.4 Economic Tssi~es 
- 
As was previously mentioned, the issue of economics can be denoted as one of the 
two major divisions of the open access experience; the other being issues of operation. 
Cu~rrently, in the U.S., the electrical system as it exists today is valued at 600 billion 
dollars with the equity stake of the shareholders in the investor-owned utilities being 
valued at approximately 200 billion dollars [3]. The main concern here, is that investments 
that were sound under the regulated monopolies could well prove to be poor investments 
in a competitive market. The two main financial issues that must be considered with 
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regard to OA are as follows: (1) reimbursing utilities for the costs associated with 
wheeling, and (2) the recovery of the stranded-investments mentioned earlier. [3], [7]. 
What is to be paid for transmission services is related to how the business is 
viewed [2]. In the new competitive market, the business must provide transmission 
service based on the standards of quality, reliability, security, and sufficient transmission 
capability at all times. These standards dictate what investments should be made and thus 
require that clear specifications and agreements be reached by the parties involved. 
Economic theory contends that the social optimum is achieved when, in an economic 
system, the goods and services are priced at marginal costs and installations are 
economically adapted so that they produce a given quantity at a niinimum cost [2]. 
However, marginal pricing does not finance the system operation and development, as 
marginal costs are less than average costs. In addition, a simple price tag based on 
average cost of service does not provide economic incentives for efficient operation of the 
transmission business. As one can see, the problem of pricing is a complex one and will be 
addressed firther below. 
Conroy and Murray [2], break the evaluation of the cost of wheeling into three 
main issues; technical issues, cost component, and pricing methods. Tlhe technical issues 
arise from the complexity of the actual power flow path in a utility and the associated 
co,sts. The cost component is the idea that the actual cost to a utility for a wheeling 
transaction needs to be established before a price can be set. Finally, depending on the 
way costs are evaluated, several different approaches to pricing wheeling contracts may be 
used. 
The technical issues are intimate with the economic issues of wt~eeling in that they 
affect the pricing approach for wheeling. The operational costs associated here are those 
of losses (i.e., I ~ R  losses which are path dependent), voltage control and reactive power 
costs (the wheeling utility must ensure voltages stay within specified limits as additional 
power flowing through a system can affect voltage control), and security margins (they 
may be decreased due to increased power flow). The utility that is wheeling the power 
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with either absorb costs due to the wheeling or will establish specific actions to relieve the 
effects. It is not an easy task to separate the costs and proportion between the wheeling 
transactions and the normal operation of the system. 
Conroy and Murray [3] also break down the cost component into several 
subcategories. The first is operating costs that a utility incurs during a wheeling 
transaction. The basic principal here is that prior to the transaction, the utility was 
operating in the most efficient manner possible via optimum power flow analysis and the 
most economical mix of generation. However, when the transaction occurs, this mix 
changes due to things such as transmission constraints and bus voltage limits. Thus, the 
co:;t to the utility changes, either positive or negative. Second, the utility may either gain 
or lose opportunity costs. That is, the ability or inability to import cheaper power or sell 
power wholesale because of the difference in flow that is in the system during the 
transaction. Third are the so-called reinforcement costs which refer to system expansions 
or changes that are needed to allow the wheeling transactions. Last are the embedded 
costs; these are the costs associated with the use of the existing systems. This is not an 
increased cost due to the transaction, but merely a sharing of the cost with the EWG for 
the existing system. Two terms often used to describe the above are short-nm 
int:remental cost (SRIC) and Long-rzm incremental cost (LRIC). SRIC refers to operating 
and opportunity costs and LRIC refers to operating, opportunity, and reinforcement costs. 
Or~ce again, this subject of costs is prone to debate. 
Finally, as a closing point to the economic issues, one must discuss methods of 
pricing. There has been much work done on evaluating rate structures and pricing basis, 
yeit the author was unable to find any definitive works on the topic. However, there are 
many papers which address the issue of wheeling and pricing based on various methods. 
Th.e overall thrust of this technical report is that of Real Time Pricing (F.TP), there has yet 
to be much published work done on the application of RTP to NUGs. For fbrther depth 
of the theory behind determining wheeling rates, the reader is referre:d to [8], [9], and 
[lo]. 
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Conroy and Murray [3] mention the two most common pricing methods that are 
now used to negotiate wheeling arrangements between utilities while Pkrez-Arriaga, et al. 
[2], mention two additional schemes. The two most common are the contract path and 
postage stamp (rolled-in embedded costs) methods. The contract path i~llocation assumes 
a reasonable path is chosen and total costs of the path are allocated in proportion to use or 
other measures. The postage stamp method assumes that the network in used by 
everybody connected to it and costs must be allocated based on simple measures (e.g., 
total energy injection, peak power demand). The rate is based on the embedded cost of 
the whole system, irrespective of source and load locations. In addition, the incremental 
cost allocation method determines the difference of costs between situations with and 
wiithout third party use. Finally, the megawatt mile method determir~es the changes in 
nei.work flows due to the transaction and calculates the resultant product MW times 
mileage. 
It should be noted that all of these methods contain some arbitrary assumptions 
that impact in what situations they may be applied. The best example being the near 
impossibility of determining a 'teasonable path" in a system with many interconnections 
and generators [2]. One final note; under NEPA, FERC is permitted to order utilities to 
wheel power when it is in the best interest of the public As stated befire, it is the intent 
of NEPA to encourage a competitive market place in the electric power industry. 
However, FERC policy currently has only two situations which it addresses on pricing. 
They are as follows [3]: 
When the grid has been expanded to accommodate the 
increased capacity, the utility is allowed to recover either the 
embedded cost or the expansion cost. 
When the grid is not expanded and is therefore constrained, the 
utility can charge the higher of the embedded costs or legitimate 
opportunity costs. These are defined as costs that may be 
encountered in the transmission capacity to be utilized by the 
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wheeling utility itself to realize economy sales or purchases, 
which would have resulted in lowering of the rates to the 
utility's native load customers. 
11.5 Operational Issues 
Regardless of the form that TOA takes, power system control iis required to turn 
the: policies into practice. The focus of TOA can be viewed in time frames (i.e., before the 
fact, real-time, and after the fact). Before the fact considerations uses the current practice 
of advanced resource and he1 scheduling to meet the forcasted load demand for the week 
ahead, however the analysis must also include demands of the TOA participants and the 
need to schedule new resources. Therefore, the operators are in need of additional 
information such as planned outages and deratings of transmission facilities, transmission 
usage reservation, and prioritization policies at least a week in advance. Operators will 
have to consider brokering of quoted purchases and sales over a much wider area, 
transmission capacity, path assignments with security allotments, parallel paths, and loss 
allocation. [ 2 ] .  
With real-time considerations, operators must be responsive to load demands and 
be prepared to respond quickly to unexpected events. TOA introduces a new dimension 
to power system operation and security assessment -- transmission system control. This 
control implies the use of Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS), system stability 
and security constraint monitoring, and protective relaying coordinaticx~ consistent with 
transmission control among other things. [ 2 ] .  
Once again, TOA complicates the issues, even of after the fact cost analysis. Cost 
reconstruction will be significantly affected by the TOA policies implemented. Settlements 
will require new analytical tools to resolve the payment issues. [2 ] .  
The operating point of a system is dependent on the system's 1.opology (which is 
usually defined by the passive components) and is defined by the load flow (LF) solution 
or the optimal load flow (OPF) solution [ 6 ] .  The introduction of an E,WG into a system 
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changes the system topology and introduces a new active componer~t to the network 
which impacts the whole of the utility's operational strategies. Thus, the location of an 
EVVG will have a significant impact on the operation and security of a system. Prior to 
connection, a transmitting network has an already established load flow for real and 
reactive power in each transmission line that is based on existing generator bus voltage, 
reactive power generation, loadings, transformer and phase shifler tap settings, and the 
location and setting of the reactive power compensation devices. When an EWG is 
connected to the system, the direction of the proposed wheeling of real power is 
determined by the locations of the EWG and it's proposed load. On the affected 
transmission lines, wheeled power may be in the same direction or in the opposite 
direction to the prevailing flow. If the wheeling flows are in the opposite direction, one 
call expect a decrease in line losses, where as if they are in the same direction one can 
ex,pect an increase in losses and network loading. Figure IV.3 shows the Ward and Hale 6  
bus system for two scenarios which were performed by Ouyang and Deep [6]  to study the 
effects of placement of the EWG. Note that the load flow results for the base case (no 
E\VG) are indicated as (0) and the results of scenario one and scenario two are indicated 
by (1) and (2), respectively. The statement of the example is presented here from [6] :  
This exan~ple consists of two wheefii~g scenarios on 
the Ward and Hale 6 blrs system. Scenario one represtwts 
the additioi~ of a I5 MW EWG generator connected to B Z ~ S  
3 and a designated I5 0.9 power factor EWG Load 
represented by a load increnre at Blrs 5. Scenario two 
addresses the au'ditioi~ of a I5 MW EWG generator which 
is placed or1 Brrs 6 and an associated load connected to Bus 
2. The stlrdy of the Ioadjlow of the base case indicates ,!hat 
the prevailing power jlows along transnlissior~ line 25 from 
IV. 16 
bzrs 2 to btrs 5) and 35 are directed toward Btts 5. Thej'ow 
direction along line 26 in toward Btis 6. . . . 
Figure IV.3 Load Flow Results Depicting How 
Placement of EWG Affects Flows [6] 
Th.e total losses of each scenario are summed up in Table IV. 1 below. 
Table IV.1 Snmmary of Total Losses in Load Flow Studies 
r Scenario MW 
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Since the prevailing flow of power (in the base case) is from Bus 2 to Bus 6, one would 
expect that network losses would be reduced in scenario 2. It is noted from Figure IV.3 
that the results of scenario 1 are just the opposite. In scenario one, the losses increased by 
2.11 MW and 9.09 MVAR from the base case. In scenario 2, however, losses were 
decreased by 2.91 MW and 7.18 MVAR. Thus, the security in scenario 2 is increased 
because the loading on line 62 is decreased. The wheeling of power in scenario one 
caused the 15 MVA transformer (35) to be overloaded to 19.3 MVA. 
Ouyang and Deeb [6] go on to present two more cases which are of interest in 
operational issues. In the second case, a 15 MW EWG is connected to Bus 6 and its 
corresponding 0.8 pf load at Bus 5 (a 'kross" between scenarios 1 and 2 of case one). It 
is found that decreasing the power factor of the EWG unit from 1.0 to 0.72 in this case 
(without any other adjustment of network controls) reduces the overall real power loss by 
11% ( I  .35 MW). This indicates that EWGs should be operating at a power factor in favor 
of overall network optimization within its thermal limitations. Such optimal operating 
coliditions must be dictated by the transmitting utility through SCADMIMS controls. 
Ouyang and Deeb's third case investigates the effectiveness of adjusting network 
controls to accommodate a wheeling transaction. Recall that in scenario 1 of case 1 that 
the 15 MVA transformer (35) was overloaded as a result of the placement of the EWG. 
The authors state that the power can flow to the EWG load from two paths. Through the 
transformer, as in scenario 1, or through a transmission line from Bus 2, which is assumed 
to have the necessary capacity. To achieve this, a phase shifting transfbrmer is placed in 
line 34 and the secondary tap on transformer 35 is adjusted from 2.5% boost to 10% 
boost, thus reducing the amount of reactive power flow through the transformer. By 
adjusting the phase shifting transformer angle to -13' the real power flow on line 34 is 
greatly reduced to 0.07 MW from bus 3 to bus 4. The total power in the transformer is 
also reduced to 11.7 MW and 8.8 MVAR (14.7 MVA). The bus voltalge at Bus 5 drops 
from 0.84 (in scenario 1, case 1) to 0.8 per unit. To bring Bus 5 voltage back up to initial 
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load, a required per unit voltage at bus 1 of 1.14 is needed. This is, of course, impractical; 
but does demonstrate the effect of voltage control. 
IV.6 Security Issues 
- 
A final issue to be considered in light of NUGs and NEPA is that of the security of 
the power transmission system. This has been mentioned in passing in previous sections, 
but will now be expounded on somewhat fbrther. Power system security is defined as the 
ability to supply the system load, without overloading branches and violating bus voltages 
under normal conditions and contingencies [6],[1'1]. Since an EWC; is composed of 
generation and transmission links to the network, it will affect the sec~~rity of the system 
either by outage or by operation. Thus, EMS systems will need to be incorporated with 
security analysis hnctions that are run at each cycle of EWG generation based on security 
regulations of the particular utility and the current contract with the 13WG. As can be 
easily seen, this is not a trivial problem. Once again, Ouyang and Deeb [6], as well as 
McCalley [ l l ]  go into some depth on the analysis the security issue, and McCalley, in 
pa~rticular analyzes the costs associated with meeting system security criteria. 
IV.7 Surnrnarv 
- 
This paper has covered current trends in the deregulation of *the electric power 
intlustry due to NEPA. It has investigated economic, operational, and security issues that 
art: related to the open access of transmission systems. It was found from the literature 
that although NEPA was passed to promote growth and competition in the electric power 
intiustry by providing consumers a choice of rates it has, in fact, causedl more of a burden 
than a relief. This is mainly due to the fact that NEPA was written in very global terms 
without regard to engineering design and is thus open to interpretation by those agencies 
to which NEPA's powers are given. Perhaps, however, NEPA will stirr~ulate development 
of FACTS and other technologies which will in the long-run benefit both the consumer 
and the producer. On the other hand, NEPA may also be realized to have been a grand 
mistake and will be 'keformed': just as NEPA was to be a reform to PURPA. Only time 
will tell. Until that time conies, engineers, economists, beauracrats, and politicians all have 
their work cut out for them. 
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CHAPTER V 
Power Wheeling and Its Cost 
V-1 Abstract 
The wheeling cost is currently an area of research interest in light of the increased 
de-regulation in North America. This paper will address the issue of whe'eling cost, with 
both short- and long-term models presented. Emphasis on the use of optimal power flow 
(OPF) to handle the short-term marginal cost model is introduced. Discussions are also 
pres.ented on the topics of optimal multi-area wheeling, and reactive power wheeling. 
Optimal multi-area wheeling addresses the question of how much energy should be 
transmitted through each wheeling path and what wheeling price should be paid. This is 
formulated as a nonlinear optimization program with linear constraints and solved by the 
gradient projection method. 
Reactive wheeling is presented with the aid of AC power flow model. The ratio of 
wheeling rates between active and reactive flow shows the importance of'the latter. The 
significance of this fact is viewed in light of the trade-off between paying for reactive 
wheeling and investing in compensating plants. 
V-2; Introduction 
Recent trends in the electric power utility industry have been toward the increased 
unbundling of services provided by the utilities. Power wheeling has attracted much 
attentions and become an increasingly popular topic. 
Power wheeling is the phenomenon that can take place with multiple neighboring 
utilities when one system's transmission network is simply being used to transmit power 
from one neighbor to another. Since the automatic generation control (AGC) of the 
intermediate system will keep net interchange to a specific value regard1e:ss of the power 
being currently transmitted, the transmission losses incurred in the interrn~ediate system will 
change, and the flow of energy within the intermediate system itself for its own users will 
change also. When the losses are increased, the intermediate system has to increase its 
generation level to compensate the losses, and thus an unfair burden is added onto the 
wh~seling utility. For that reason, unless the transmission is part of the interchange 
agreement, the wheeling utility will often post a wheeling charge on its users -- the buyer 
or the seller or both. 
As pointed out in [7], three-party power transactions are frequently made in the 
United States today, where utility B finds a seller, utility S, and makes arrangement with 
utility K to complete the wheeling. The transaction is actually done in a dual manner -- S 
sells to K and K sells to B. 
Electric power utilities need to know the actual costs of providing separate 
services in order to make correct economic decisions on the various types of services they 
shoilld promote or curtail while at the same time fulfilling their service obligations. 
Utilities also need to know such costs in order to make correct eclonomic and 
eng~neering decisions on upgrading and expanding their generation, trans~nission and 
distribution facilities. 
As FACTS devices become more widely incorporated, their optimal use becomes 
an issue of interest, especially in complex wheeling situations. 
V-3 Wheeling definition and background 
As defined by the Office of Technology Assessment of the Unitecl States Congress, 
whcleling is the transnzission of electric power from a seller to a buyer, trllrough 
tratzsmission tzetwork owned by a third party. The intermediate transmission network can 
sometimes include several transmission systems, each of which wheels certain amount of 
power from the buyer to the seller. Each wheeling utility is termed as a wheel. 
When the contracted energy flow enters and leaves the wheeling utility, the flows 
throughout the wheeling utility's network will change. The transmission losses incurred in 
the wheeling utility will change. Wheeling rates are the prices it charges for use of its 
network, which determine payments by the buyers or sellers, or both, to the wheeling 
utility to compensate it for the generation and network costs incurred. 
There are four major types of wheeling depending on the relationships between the 
wheeling utility and the buyer-seller parties [5]. 
utility to utility: this is usually the case of area to area wheeling. 
utility to private user or requirenzents customer: the former is usually the case of 
area to bus wheeling, while the latter is usually the case of area to area wheeling, 
unless the requirements customer is small enough to be fed only at one bus, and 
thus becomes area to bus wheeling. 
private generator to utility: bus to area wheeling 
private generator to private generator: bus to bus wheeling. 
Wheeling power may either increase or decrease transmission losses depending n 
whether the power wheeled flows in the same direction as, or counter to, the native load 
on the wheeler's lines. Wheeling power on a heavily loaded line causes more energy 
loss.[5] 
The cost of wheeling is a current high priority problem throughout the power 
industry for utilities, independent power producers, as well as regulators. The following 
three factors have led to the importance of the cost of wheeling problem: 
1) enormous growth in transmission facilities at 230-kV and above since the 
1960's. 
2) cost differentials for electric energy between different but interconnected 
electric utilities. 
3) high cost of new plant construction versus long term, off-system capacity 
purchase. 
4) dramatic growth in non-utility generation (NUG) capacity, which includes 
1nde:pendent Power Producers (IPP) and cogenerators, due to the passage: of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Act in 1978, and the subsequent introduction of competitive bidding 
for generation capacity and energy. 
Wheeling is necessary and important for any NUG, unless the customer of a NUG 
is the utility itself to which it is directly connected. 
V-4 Wheeling cost models 
What types of costs are really involved, and how much each one is, when a utility 
whe:els certain amount of energy through its transmission network? 
The question can be addressed from either a short-term or a long-term perspective, 
and thus factors to be considered in each case varies and results differ considerably. We 
will look at the short-term model first. 
Short-Run Marginal Cost Model 
The short-run marginal costs (SRMC) of wheeling are the costs of the last MWh 
of energy wheeled, which can be computed from the difference in the marginal costs of 
e1ec:tricity at the entry and exit buses, that is, the difference in the spotp~.ices of these 
buses. An extensive treatment on the theory underlying wheeling costs, using marginal 
cosic pricing and related computations can be found in [I]. 
SRMC of wheeling = (a f g M W I ]  - (a f g M W 2 )  
where: 
fi = production cost rate at bus i in $/hour, i = 1,2 
MWi = MW injection at bus i, i = 1,2 
Antl again, this is simply the equation of spot prices. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, if utility S and utility B decide to engage in a 
trarmaction involving W MWh of energy during hour t, utility S increases its net scheduled 
interchange by W while utility B decreases its net scheduled interchange by W. This 
changes the flows throughout the network, including the lines of utility R. The specific 
flow changes are not under the direct control of any of the utilities. Kirchoff's laws and 
the changed generation patterns determine what happens. Some of this W MWh of energy 
will flow through utility K independent of whether or not utility K gives permission. The 
surn of all tie line flows into and out of utility K do not change. Howeve.r, utility K's costs 
are affected because of changes in its internal losses, which further affects its generation 
costs, and possible impacts on line flow and voltage magnitude constraints. Further, the 
cosds of the capital utility K has invested in its transmission system can not be ignored. 
As demand patterns, generator availability , and transmission availability vary over 
a day and longer periods, the utilities' dispatching patterns and costs vary. This gives rise 
to time-varying spot prices, which capture all relevant economic and engineering 
information. Because of losses and system security constraints, it is unde.rstood that 1 
MM1h of energy has different values at different time and different buses of the network. 
Since wheeling is analogous to buying energy at one set of buses and sellimg it at another 
set of buses, these spot price differences determine the cost of wheeling. 
However, a sound costing method should further incorporate embedded costs, 
shoilld take into consideration system security, VAr requirements and voltage profile. An 
analytical tool well equipped to address this issue is the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) 
program. 
Optimal Power How programs can be used to effectively determine the cost and 
viability of NUG options or wheeling contracts. OPFs model both the generation and 
transmission systems and for a particular snap-shot in time can yield extre:mely accurate 
information on such quantities as short-term marginal wheeling costs. 
Contrast to the ordinary power flows which calculate system parameters such as 
voltages at load buses corresponding to a specified setting of variables such as generator 
power output, OPFs attempt to find the best possible setting for a list of control variables 
such that a desired objective is met. The control variables include generator bus voltages, 
transformer and phase shifter settings, real power at generator buses, addition of VArs and 
shedding load. 
Such OPF also model system security constraints which set the optimal control 
setting such that the system can survive a specified list of contingencies. 
A h'ypothetical Wheeling Case 
As reported in [6], the IEEE 30-bus test system, as shown in Figure [V-1] below, 
is illustrated here for a hypothetical wheeling case. There are 3 transmission areas 1,5, 
and 12 in the system, which is being centrally dispatched. The NUG on bus 14 of area 5 
wishes to sell 50 MW of firm power to a process industry located at bus 27 of area 12. 
The: contract path for this power transfer is through areas 5 and 12. The following 
system-wide and line flow constraints are specified: 
system-wide constraint 
voltage limits: 0.95 pu to 1.05 pu normal, 0.9 pu to 1.1 pu emergency 
line flow constraints 
line 15 to 23: 15 MVA normal, 20 MVA emergency 
line 22 to 24: 1 1 MVA normal, 15 MVA emergency 
- 
line 6 to 28: 40 MVA normal, 45 MVA emergency 
The following contingency constraints were defined to maintain system security with the 
wheeling contract: 
contingency constraints 
generator on bus 8 out of service 
line from bus 19 to bus 20 out of service 
line from bus 23 to bus 24 out of service 
With the above case defined, we can look at several important aspects of' this wheeling 
contract, which in the end, will shape the cost of the overall cost of the contract. They 




Figure[V-1] IEEE 30-Bus Test System for Hypothetical Ciue [6] 
1 .  transfer limits with VAr requirements: 
To determine the transfer limits of a given hour of a day, a single run security 
cclnstrained OPF is all that is needed. The result takes into consideration voltage and line 
flow limits, tap and VAr compensation limits, phase shifter limits and security limits. 
Transfer capability can often be increased by adding VArs at strategic locations of 
the system. VAr size and sites may be determined by an OPF. System security is also a 
major factor in the determination of transfer capability. As expected, an ordinary OPF run 
without security constraints may seriously overestimate the maximum transfer limits. 
Table[V-21 shows the result of several OPF runs and shows the effect of VAr 
compensation in the transmission system. It also shows that security colnstraints are of 
paramount importance in establishing the maximum transfer limit. For example, the 
system can wheel 44.1 MW without security constraints (and without V.Ar compensation). 
But when system security constraints are applied, only 34.4 MW of power can be wheeled 
(again, without VAr compensation). 
NUG NUG Added Wheeling 
G e n e r a n o n u  S h u n r s w  
w MW MVAr MW 
Thre Contingencies 34.4 30.9 56 3.5 
No Contingencies 44.1 40.0 23 4.1 
Thne Contingencies 24.1 21.8 0 2.3 
(No M V h )  
No Contingencies 36.2 32.5 0 3.7 
W o  M v h )  
Table[V-21 Maximum Transfer Limits and Shunt VAr Requirements [6] 
2. (!ass a Llocation 
The wheeling losses in Table[V-21 represent the additional transnlission losses due 
to the wheeling contract. 
The question of how to allocate the cost of the increased losses due to wheeling 
becomes a complicated one if the wheeling requires the utility to re-dispatch generation to 
acc:ornmodate the wheeling. One solution is to use OPF to compute an economic dispatch 
with and without the wheeling arrangement. The difference apparently points to the 
iml~act due to wheeling, and a cost can be associated with it. In this case, if multiple 
wheeling contracts are being considered, several program runs must be made with the 
corltracts grouped by priority. 
An example on our 30-bus system can demonstrate the above thelory. The results 
are shown in Table[V-31. The OPF is run for dispatch with and without wheeling, 
obs,ening all the constraints mentioned earlier. The base case represents the that without 
wheeling. Again the cases with and without contingency considerations we shown and 
compared against. 
The assumption we are making here is that the network can accommodate the 50 
MW being supplied by the NUG, provided that the 3 utilities (area 1,5, and 12) re- 
dispatch their generation. 
NUG NUG Added System 
Case Descriution Generation mi a 
MW M W M V A I  Mw 
1. Three Contingencies 0.0 0.0 10 3.2 
(Base Case) 
2. No Contingencies 0.0 0.0 10 3.2 
(Base Case) 
- 3. Three Contingencies 50.0 46.1 950 19.3 
(Wheeling Case) 
4. No Contingencies 50.0 50.0 102 10.7 
(Wheeling Case) 
Table[V-31 Loss Allocation when Utilities Re-dispatch Generation [6] 
As shown in Table[V-31, for the base case, no additional VArs were needed to 
salisfy the contingency conditions, implying that the system was designed to survive these 
contingencies. When the wheeling problem was considered without the contingencies, the 
OE'F program found that there was a substantial increase in the losses and the required 
compensation, but the desired 50-MW of power could still be delivered bus 27. The 
situation is different when the contingencies are considered. Only 46.1-PvlW could be 
delivered at the load because of the MVA flow limits on the line from bus 15 to 23. In 
addition, the compensation requirements and the losses were significantly higher. For 
ex;unple, to transfer close to 50-MW of power, the added shunt compensation is as high 
as 950-MVAr, which will almost certainly make this wheeling contract very uneconomical. 
Generation 
. . 
escr- Big d M W  MVAr 
1. Three Contingencies 1 195.70 246.34 91.00 1.83 
(Bm b) 5 59.30 40.23 21.82 0.76 
12 28.10 0.00 0.00 0.58 
NUG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2. No Contingencies 1 195.70 246.34 91.00 1.83 
(Base-) 5 59.30 40.23 24.82 0.76 
12 28.40 0.W 0.00 0.58 
NUG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3. Thne Conringencia 1 195.70 288.75 4.84 6.36 
(Wheeling Case) 5 59.30 10.00 1.18 .11.69 
12 28.40 0.00 0.00 1.21 
NUG 46.10 50.00 4.56 0.00 
4. No Contingencies 1 195.70 264.09 112.08 1.90 
(Wteeling Case) 5 59.30 30.00 4.20 6.17 
12 28.40 0.00 0.00 2.63 
NUG 50.00 50.00 -33.76 '0.00 
Table[V-41 Area Losses and Generation ( M W )  [6] 
From the change in total losses, it is relatively easy to determine the energy cost of 
trar~srnission for the NUG. This is computed by taking the difference between total losses 
bef'ore and after wheeling. If contingencies are not monitored, the NUG ivould be liable 
for 7.50-MW ( = (1.90 + 6.17 + 2.63) - ( 1.83 + 0.76 + 0.58)) of losses. If contingencies 
are considered, the NUG would be liable for 16.09-MW ( = (6.36 + 11.69 + 1.21) - (1.83 
+ 0.76 + 0.58)) of losses. 
Table[V-41 compares the losses and generation of MW's and MVAr's for each 
area before and after wheeling. Such a breakdown in losses and generation is necessary to 
determine a basis for compensating individual utilities for the increased transmission losses 
due to wheeling. Mechanisms similar to "split-savings" can be used to alllocate costs when 
utilities re-dispatch to accommodate wheeling contracts. 
3. cost of wheeling wing short run marginal cost model 
At this stage, the marginal costs at all buses are readily available from OPFs. This 
is because OPF algorithms inherently use partial derivatives to minimize the objective 
function. If the objective function is production cost, the partial derivatives of the cost 
with respect to real power can be easily obtained for each bus in the system. The marginal 
cost of wheeling power between two buses is simply the difference between their partial 
derivatives. 
In general, power should be wheeled between buses which have llow marginal 
wheeling cost. Non-zero marginal wheeling costs arise due to losses or power flow 
constraints. As we understand, if we can have a perfect (unrealistic) dispatch, the 
incremental cost at each bus will be the same, as the Equal Incremental Clost rule will 
determine, and thus the cost of wheeling will be zero. 
The marginal costs of wheeling power originating at bus 14 of the IEEE test 
sys tem for these cases is presented in Table[V-51. As expected, the case with no line flow 
limits has the lowest marginal wheeling costs. These costs increase dramatically for 
certain buses when there are flow or security constraints. In the cases presented in 
Table[V-51, this occurs when power is being wheeled beyond the transfer limits of the 
network capability and very high cost emergency power purchases from neighboring 
utilities are used to accommodate the wheeling. When security as well as line constraints 
are observed, the marginal cost of wheeling increases for most buses. In general, as we 
may expect, the more constrained the system, the more costly it is to wheel power 
between buses. Table[V-51 also shows some instances where marginal wheeling costs 
decrease as a result of recognizing line limits and security constraints. However, such 
decreases are usually off-set by large increase in marginal wheeling costs elsewhere in the 
system. 
We should note that adding new lines or installing VArs may be implemented to 
remove flow constraints and thus lower the marginal cost of wheeling. OPF program run 
may be used to quantify the benefits of such capital expenditures to support wheeling 
transactions. 
In addition, as we noted earlier, the marginal cost of wheeling varies from hour to 
hour, corresponding to loading conditions and the state of the system. To form a basis for 
the calculation of wheeling charges, marginal cost of wheeling needs to be evaluated over 
an extended period of time. 
CASE I CASE I1 CASE 111 
Line Limits Line Limits No Line Limits 
Bus + Security No Security No Security 
Number ConstrainQ Constrain& constraints 





























Table[V-51 Short Term Absolute Marginal Costs of Wheeling for the: 30 Bus Case for 
Power Originating from Bus 14 [6] 
In conclusion, Optimal Power Flows are a versatile tool for evaluation of NUG or 
wheeling options for utility system planning. OPFs provide vital informa1:ion regarding: 
Voltage Support: OPFs can calculate the change in system componernt settings to 
maintain the desired voltage profile. This can be done in one single OPF run. 
VAr Requirements: OPFs can calculate the best sites and amount for shunt 
compensation required to accommodate a NUG or wheeling contract. The VAr 
requirements can be found by a single run of OPF. 
System Security: OPFs ensure that system security constraints are met while 
accommodating a NUG or wheeling contract. 
System Losses: OPFs quantify the effect of a new NUG or wheeling contract on 
system losses, and thus information be used to minimize losses. 
Short Term Marginal Cost of Wheeling: can be determined and form a starting point in 
the calculation of wheeling cost. 
A number of embedded as well as newly developed long-run incr~emental methods 
detzrmining the costs of firm wheeling, and to present methodologies that allocate the 
wh~zeling costs in the case of multiple wheels present in the system is presented in [I]. 
Embedded Cost Models 
Embedded cost of wheeling methods, used throughout the utility industry, 
allocated the embedded capital costs and the average annual operation (not production) 
ancl maintenance costs of existing facilities to a particular wheel; these facilities include 
transmission, subtransmission, and substation facilities. Happ has given a detailed 
treatment on all the methods as well as their algorithms in [2]. 
There are 4 types of embedded methods: 
Rolled-in-embedded method 
Contract path method 
Boundary flow method 
Line-by-line method 
Ror'led-In-Embedded Method 
This method assumes that the entire transmission system is used in wheeling, 
regardless of the actual transmission facilities that carry the wheel. The cost of wheeling 
as determined by this method is independent of the distance of the wheel, which is the 
reason that the method is also known as the Postage Stamp Method. The embedded 
capital costs correspondingly reflect the entire transmission system. 
Co,ntract Path Method 
This method is based upon the assumption that the wheel is confined to flow along 
a specified electrically continuous path through the wheeling company's transmission 
system. Changes in flows in facilities which are not along the identified path are ignored. 
Thlus this method is limited to those facilities which lie along this assume.d path. 
Boundary Flow Method 
This method incorporates changes in MW boundary flows of the wheeling 
cotnpany due to a wheel, on either a line basis or on a net interchange ba~sis, into the cost 
of .wheeling. Two power flows, executed successively for every year with and without 
each wheel, yield the changes in either individual boundary line or net interchange MW 
flows. The load level represented in the power flows can be at peak load or any other 
appropriate load. 
Lin e-by-line Method 
This method considers changes in MW flows due to the wheel in all transmission 
lines of the wheeling company, and the line lengths in miles. Two power flows executed 
with and without the wheel yield the changes in MW flows in all transmission lines. 
In general, the first two methods are considered to be traditional ,and widely used 
in power industry. Neither of them require power flow executions and associated studies 
to identify the companies, and in the case of the contract path method, the transmission 
lines which are the principal carriers of the wheel. Simplicity is their advantage. 
In the absence of sufficient system studies, no identifications as to the principal 
trarismission lines or companies responsible for the wheeling can be a serious limitation. 
The latter two embedded cost methods require the execution of power flow, and 
thus have the potential to improve upon the limitations for the first two methods. 
There are 2 limitations common to all 4 embedded cost methods: 
1) The methods consider only the costs of existing transmission facilities. 
2) The methods do not consider changes in production costs as a result of required 
cha~nges in dispatch and or unit commitment due to the presence of the wheel. 
Other cost factors may exist which contribute to the cost of whee:ling. For 
exa~mple, the economic purchases or sales of power which have to be CUI-tailed to 
accommodate the wheel due to transmission limits. 
Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) Models 
- 
Long run incremental transmission costs for wheeling account for: 
a) the investment costs for reinforcement to accommodate the wheel, or credit for 
delaying or avoiding reinforcements, and 
b) the charge in operating costs and incremental operation and maintenance costs 
incurred due to the wheel. 
There are currently two models for the LRIC methodologies: standard long run 
incremental cost (SLRIC) methodology and long run fully incremental cost (LRFIC) 
methodology. 
The standard long run incremental cost method uses traditional system planning 
approaches to determine reinforcements that are required, and corresponding investment 
sch.edules with and without each wheel, throughout the study period. If more than one 
wheel is present in the study period, the cost of each reinforcement and the change in 
operating costs, have to be accurately allocated to each wheel. 
The long run fully incremental cost method does not allow excess transmission 
capacity to be used by a wheel but forces a reinforcement along the path of the wheel to 
acc:ommodate it; if more than one wheel is present in the study period, a reinforcement is 
required for each separate wheel.[2] 
V-5 Multi-area wheeling 
Multi-area wheeling is a real world practical concern, because wheeling from a 
seller to a buyer involves power flow through several intermediate netw'orks. How much 
power should be wheeled through each path, what wheeling charges shcluld be applied to 
each such transaction and how these decisions can be made optimal? FACTS devices, 
which are now made more and more available, should be controlled to a'chieve these 
optimal transfers through each separate path. 
Consider an interconnected system with multiple intermediate wheeling utilities 
and multiple seller-buyer couples. A simplified version of this set up is slhown in 
Figure[V-61 with 3 intermediate wheeling utilities W1, W2, and W3, and one buyer and 
seller pair (S-B). There are 7 inter-utility wheeling paths, given by the directed path kl 
through k7. 
Figure[V-61 Multi-Area Wheeling Topology [3] 
Suppose that the energy to be transported through each path is slet arbitrarily, then 
the: computation of wheeling rates for each path can be obtained from the solution of an 
economic dispatch problem using OPF program. To decide the optimal power flow on 
each path, the power flows can be set as variables and the wheeling rates can be used to 
improve the initial set values. The total operating costs have to be minimized considering 
the: topological structure of multi-wheeling areas and the feasible region of wheeling 
power flow. The topological relation can be reflected in the following matrix equation. 
The assumptions made for the relation are: 
1. power inflow is given a positive sign and power outflow is given a negative sign; and 
2. we are only concerned with the sale of unit power from S to B. 
Each row column multiplication represents one power balance equation for a particular 
utility (there are a total of 5 utilities in this example). 
Thjs turns out to be a nonlinear program with linear constraints. The gradient of the 
objective function turned out to be the marginal cost of electricity at the buses of power 
entrance and exit, which can be found from the OPF solution. Since the constraints are 
1int:ar this problem is solved by a gradient projection method. Interested readers can 
consult [3] for details and example in the solution of this problem. 
V-6 Wheeling concerns for reactive power 
Reactive energy flows can be important as they affect both real lihe losses and 
voltage magnitudes, and therefore impact on the total operating cost of the system. As 
power system margins are reduced because of emphasis on the greater use of generation 
ancl transmission, power systems are operated much closer to their technjical limits. Thus 
the marginal cost of reactive power, and the effect of reactive power on the marginal cost 
of real power should be included in the overall considerations of wheeling rates, especially 
wbzn an average rather than a real time wheeling rate is needed, since the establishment 
of wheeling rates need to allow for modifications in reactive resources. IPor example, a 
capacitor installation funded by the seller-buyer of the wheel may be cost: effective 
cornpared to simply accepting the "as is" wheeling rate. 
Real time prices for reactive power can provide information to both users and 
dis-patchers of electricity about the cost and value of reactive power usage, flow and 
sources. In general, although the marginal cost of reactive power generation is far 
snltzller than for real power, the important point is that the diferences between the entry 
ant1 exit buses for real and reactive power are comparable. Therefore in the computation 
of wheeling costs, reactive energy flow is not negligible. 
If the wheeling rates of reactive power flow are to be considered., an AC model 
must be used. A modification of optimal power flow model, which allows for the spot 
price responsiveness of both real and reactive power demand, is used in [4] to analyze the 
wheeling rates of real and reactive power. 
At first sight, if the production costs of reactive power are taken to be negligibly 
small, the pricing of reactive wheel may appear to depend primarily on its impact on 
transmission losses and on the changes in the wheelers production costs brought about by 
the need to reschedule any of its own dispatch. However, when the system loading is very 
hea.vy, the flow of reactive power can push bus voltages, tap change transformer settings 
or circuit loading to their limits, or in an opposite orientation, can bring them off limits. 
The consequence of system constraint activation is not confined to reactive wheeling 
pricing only but also seriously affects real power pricing and wheeling. 
It is concluded in [4] that: 
reactive power flow associated with a wheel affects costs because it i-mpacts on losses, 
allowable operating ranges, and generating costs; 
that DC load flow model is inappropriate for determining wheeling rates because they 
ignore the effects of reactive power flow; an AC-OPF model must be: used; 
that the potential error of ignoring reactive power in wheeling studies increase with the 
magnitude of the wheel and if the power factor of the wheel is adverse; 
reactive power wheeling charges, and the changes in real power wheeling charges 
brought about by reactive wheeling, provide a useful guideline of what savings can be 
made by installing reactive compensating equipment, and thus pr0vid.e pertinent 
information in deciding an appropriate level of reactive plant investment. 
V-7 Conclusions 
A comprehensive review of the subject of power wheeling in light of wheeling cost 
models, optimization of multi-area wheeling and considerations for reactive power 
whleeling are presented in this paper. 
It is concluded that short run marginal cost of wheeling can be effectively 
eva~luated using the security constrained Optimal Power Flow program. Several 
embedded cost models and long run incremental cost models of wheeling were briefly 
introduced. 
It is found that the optimization problem of multi-area wheeling is a nonlinear 
program with linear constraints and therefore can be solved by gradient projection 
method. Considerations on the topological structures of multiple wheels are expressed in 
a matrix form equation. 
The evaluation of reactive energy flow shows that reactive poweir can affect both 
real line losses and system voltage profile. Thus its impact is both short- and long-term, 
ancl should not be neglected in calculating an averaged over time wheeling cost. 
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Calculation of Marginal (Incremental) Fuel Costs of a RTP Program 
J. S. Lee 
VI. 1. Introduction 
Since their early days electric utilities have being interested in rate design and other 
dernand side management programs as a way to improve capacity utilization [ '9, page 881. Open 
trai~smission access and competition have heated even more the interest in pricing strategies. 
RTP program design must be tailor made for each customer class according to the kind of service 
provided, because customer capability and willingness to response to prices are a prime aspect in 
this tariff. In the current electricity industry jargon, real-time pricing (RTP) is a kind of rate that 
allows the utility to determine a different electricity price for every hour of the day, every day, 
based on utility incremental costs1 [6] [7]. This paper analyzes an especial RlrP design that aims 
large industrial users that own cogeneration facilities and it requires that the industrial customer 
inform back which quantity it is going to use. Since this program departs fronn the usual RTP 
calculation method, this paper develops an alternate method that best reflect the incremental cost 
caused by the adoption of this specific program. 
I The RTP price schedules may also differentiate according to customer location. Customers located over 
difierent transmission or distribution lines may be charged different prices according to the load (and 
consequent losses) in the line during the period considered. Power literature criticizes nodal price 
imj'lementation because of potential market power discretion 1131 and perverse pricing of due to the 
interaction of power flows [12]. 
Recently real-time pricing has found a place as a marketing tool in a more and more 
competitive and liberal utility environment. Also, since neighbor utilities may use hourly power 
exchange transactions, to minimize fuel cost of the system, RTP is not only a demand side 
strategy, but also a supply option to customers willing to participate. If custolner's response is in 
the same time frame of neighbor utilities, the local utility may become a power broker that can 
find the best energy alternative in the region[l6]. Whatever the utility is in a ]regulated or 
coxnpetitive environment RTP can improve utility operation and capacity resource use. 
The final price the utility will offer to the consumer will depend on contractual nuances 
between customer and utility, utility required return over fix costs and utility load profile. 
Nevertheless, the main variation source in RTP price determination is utility i~ncremental fuel and 
operational costs. The objective of this paper is to propose a method to calculate real-time price 
of il program that offers a weekly price-quantity consumption schedule in one hour price 
inttxvals. The real-time price determination is based on the utility own incremental fuel cost of 
electricity and one hour power imported and exported from neighbor utilities. This paper will 
not discuss the contractual and structural that alter the final RTP. One may refer to [3], [2] and 
[8] for a discussion of these aspects. 
VI.2. A price system that considers electricity s u ~ p l y  and demand 
RTP belongs to the incremental cost rate family, like of time of day (TOD) pricing rates, 
with which the utility industry has had long time experience. On time of day pricing, the utility 
ma:y modify prices once a month or a year, to usually offer 2 different prices. A low price for 
electricity used during valley periods (for example, night time) and a high price for used during 
peek periods. Ideally difference between the two prices is the average difference in incremental 
production costs between the two levels of demand (valley and peak). RTP is a more intense 
implementation of TOD pricing, which allows a better approximation of the system cost 
cor~ditions and recent changes in consumption patterns. 
Supply factors refer to system resource status and load, such as commitment and output 
level of generating units, spinning reserve, reliability level, transmission and clistribution line 
loads and neighbor or pool economic power transfer prices. Supply resources are usually used 
up in incremental order from the lowest to the highest marginal or incrementall cost. In the short 
run the utility wants to minimize in marginal fuel and outage costs while obtaiining enough 
revenue to cover fixed costs. Fixed costs are supply factors related to long run capacity. Usually 
the state utility commission determines an amount each customer (or customer class) 
corltribution to fix costs, when it defines rate class revenue requirements. RTP rates must also 
collect an exact revenue requirement to contribute to the system fix cost investment. 
Some utilities classify RTP programs as demand side management programs (DSM), 
because of this need of understanding the customer and of their potential for increasing the utility 
ability to forecast and control system loads. The utility may use load control as a tool to improve 
capacity utilization, reliability and operational efficiency, and potentially postpone capacity 
expansion. RTP and other incremental rate strategies, nonetheless, allow the utility to increase 
load control signals to a broader base of customers and applications than traditional DSM 
programs. The reason for potentially larger participation is that incremental cost information 
cor~veyed in form of prices allows the customer to valuate his own alternative ways for 
cor~serving and using electricity. Besides incremental cost rates preserve custlomer choice and 
satjlsfaction, RTP as a tool of demand control is not perfect because of individual customer 
response variability to electricity prices. This statement makes clear that RTP' is not the final 
answer for electric power control, but another instrument used to smooth operations and 
maximizes benefits to system resource users. 
VI.2.1 Customer response to electricity prices 
Demand factors have take a central consideration in RTP programs, since customer 
electricity service requirements, load characteristics and price responsiveness are key for RTP 
success. Customer requirements vary with customer class and usually include: power quality, 
service voltage, number of meters, load level, power factor and harmonic limitations. . These 
requirements may affect fix (or capacity) or variable (or energy) costs or relat~~ve to marginal cost 
language, long or short run marginal costs. The utility may reduce outage costs and therefore 
reduce its RTP price, if the customer agrees with an interruptible RTP rate. Sczhweepe [14] called 
by as price-quantity transactions RTP programs that combine 24 price update and an interruptible 
contract. Note that in this kind of RTP the calculation of reserve requirement!; does not include 
the expected RTP participant demand. 
In the regulated utility environment, customers are divided in classes according to the 
services they require (that is, voltage level, maximum peak demand, minimum energy 
consumption during a month, power quality, etc.). All customers in a rate cla.ss share the costs 
the utility incurs to provide the services. The costs associated to a rate class refer to the 
investment made in the past to serve its customers current and future demand, plus variable costs 
associated with energy consumed and rate class reliability requirements. Contractual nuances in 
a rate class may affect directly utility incremental fuel costs, in which case they must be 
considered in the calculation of RTP as marginal costs. For instance, contractual arrangements 
about power quality, such as, firm or interruptible contract, number of interruptions a year and 
notification time before interruptions may directly affect marginal fuel costing. Other 
cor~tractual nuances may refer to fix cost investment that a customer class must repay because 
they were specifically or shared by the class, such as transmission and distribution equipment 
required. These repayments maybe collected as fix adders or multipliers in unit prices. 
Customer division in rate classes does not necessarily indicate that customers in the same 
ratt: class have the same response to electricity price changes, i.e., common e1:lsticity price 
ela,sticity. Nevertheless, we can assume that the responses of n customers in a. rate class have the 
same effect of n identical representative class customers' responses. As electricity prices vary 
this representative customer will choose to consume different amounts of the electricity or, more 
precisely, electricity services. This quantity choice depends on the value the representative 
customer attributes to electricity services and the current cost to the customer of using some 
alternative good or service that replaces the electricity services. The value peirception of 
electricity services that a single customer has may differ from one day to the next or over other 
periods of time. For example, an industrial customer may value more electriciity services the 
larger number of orders received last week, or the larger the number of machines he foresees will 
be available in the next few hours. Hence the elasticity response of the same individual may 
change over time given some especial conditions. When this effects accumulate over a large 
number of customers the response variability is smaller unless the utility errs the forecast of 
factors that are common to all consumer class. E.g. all residential customers rnay require 
unforeseen extra heating during a day which temperature was lower than the utility forecast. 
Besides own price elasticity the utility must be aware of other customers' input and 
output electricity cross price elasticities when forecasting customer behavior. Electricity cross 
price elasticity is the ration of percent change in electricity consumption and the percent change 
of other product price. In the case of customers that cogenerate using gas turbine, prices of 
natural gas or of other gas sources may affect the response of electricity consumption in a given 
period. David [5]  studied the effects of electricity prices in other periods in the consumption of 
electricity in the current period, he called this effects inter-temporal price elasticity effects. 
Soinetimes the utility can not efficiently predict cross price elasticities, because changes in 
marginal prices of fuel or valuation of electricity services are intrinsic of the customer operation. 
For instance, in the steel making process the gas by-product in the coke oven:; and blast furnaces 
has a marginal price equal to zero for the steel cogeneration equipment. The supply availability 
of by-product gas may vary with the production schedule in the plant, that ma:y not be disclosed 
for competitive reasons. 
Even developing models that predict RTP participants to electricity prices, the utility still 
must expose itself to risk (losses) due to imperfect participant behavior forecasting. If the utility 
assumes that the participants are going to have an undesirable high con~umpti~on during some 
period of the day, it might propose a high price to clip demand during that period. However it 
might happen that participants' valuation of electricity services in that particular period is even 
higher than the offered prices. And participants' consumption of electricity is higher than 
expected causing prices to lower than the actual incremental costs. The same error may occur in 
the other direction. It might be that low prices are not low enough during some time period to 
create participant's demand. If the utility had forecast correctly this lower than normal valuation 
of electricity services, electricity prices might be set at a lower level and attract some extra 
dernand. The utility may correct its error margin if the RTP contract allows for utility 
interruptions. However the use of interruptions must be limited to contract agreement and 
therefore will ultimately be factored in the service cost. 
VI.2.2 Using existing Utility "Software" to Calculate RTP 
Kirsch et al. [lo] derived an algorithm "for forecasting day-ahead hourly marginal costs" 
bas,ed on existent utility "operational software" to determine RTP for Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp. In the case of the rate Niagara Mohawk offers RTP must reflect marginal operating costs 
ant1 marginal outage costs, and would allow price to differ over time and by geographic area. 
RTP may vary with geographic area because the location of loads relative to generators may 
affect marginal operation costs and reliability given transmission constraints. The authors 
modified the economic dispatching algorithm to do the 1 day ahead marginal operational and 
reliability cost forecasting. In reality New York Power Pool was the one running the original 
dispatching algorithm since Niagara Mohawk is part of the pool. 
Kirsch reports that the algorithm the modifications were not trivial and the solution 
method must be altered, increasing computational effort and procedure ~ompl~exity. The 
previous method would eliminate binding units or reserve constraints from computation, but the 
new problem needed the shadow costs of the unit bounds and reserve constraints to determine 
corltributions to RTP. The final procedure is divided in three steps. First, forecast the next day 
hourly loads and external exchanges. Second, generate the problem constraints, namely, demand 
cor~straints, generator constraints (using only the committed generators), transmission 
cor~straints(using power flow analysis and B-matrix as penalty factor) and reliability constraints 
(pool determined reserve). Third, solve the economic dispatch for each hour of the next day. 
Note those transmission lines that are constraining the problem may not be tie-lines coming in 
ancl out of each area. Therefore determining the marginal transmission cost 01' one area may 
require taking the shadow prices of the transmission interface constraints as a starting point to a 
more involving procedure. 
This procedure, however, fails to use final RTP prices as a feed-back in the initial 
dernand forecast, besides the theory of RTP extracts most of its gains from the customer response 
to t:lectricity prices. The authors do not consider that RTP may be used to minimize costs related 
to unit commitment problem, probably because of rate characteristics and other operation 
corlstraints. After all, the utility does not need to restrict its RTP planning horizon to 24 hours, 
because prices are sent to customers only one day ahead. The unit commitme:nt problem is 
brc'ught in since RTP or another complementary incremental cost rate may change demand levels 
ancl system load distribution enough to change typical day patterns. When using RTP strategies, 
utilities must be careful to not be only changing the peak, instead of filling the: valleys. 
VI.3. A modified real time pricing program 
This paper calculates marginal fuel costs in detail for a RTP specific program that a 
util.ity may offer to large interruptible load industrial customers. We think that the reader can use 
the details of this fix framework and of other specific RTP experiences and generalize to his own 
problem [10I1[17]. Caramanis et al. [2] attempt to characterize possible RTP programs according 
to implementation complexity levels and potential benefits. The smaller interval between price 
schedule updates reflects more accurately the evolving states of the system and its marginal 
cos,ts. If price update intervals are too small the customer may not have the technical and 
ecc~nomical ability respond then. An alternative to smaller notification time intervals is to 
require the customer to inform its consumption pattern ahead in time and tie this load informed to 
a take or pay contract. This procedure only reduces system load uncertainty (and marginal costs) 
from the modified RTP participant customer, but may be an important contribution if the number 
of l~articipants is large a load information is accurate. All other customers (non-RTP 
participants) load sources are still uncertain, and the utility must deal with them. 
Large steel industrial customers that plan weekly their operation and resource 
corrsumption dominate the load in the data we obtain for our experiments. Hence we assume, the 
utility follows the same time frame to update its prices and sends once a week a price schedule to 
all participating customers. This price schedule has of three price-quantity tiers. Each tier 
corltains maximum load and corresponding prices for every hour in the following week. The 
customer must use the price schedule to plan her operations during the next week and inform the 
utility which tier she is going to use. If customer consumption exceeds the informed tier 
maximum load at any hour of the week, the excess energy price must equal to the period 
marginal (incremental) cost plus a contractual penalty adder. Therefore, the customer must select 
the tier that provides the minimum energy requirements for every hour in the week ahead. This 
prc~cedure by itself promotes customer interest in controlling peaks. 
Table VI. 1 Symbol glossary. 
- 
Aa'der,: Fixed embedded cost portion of the real-time price used to remunerate fix costs used 
at time t .  
- 
Dl : Forecast system power demand during time interval t, that is price independent. 
D,(, (pe,,): Forecast system power demand during time interval t in tier q, given the vector of 
electricity prices for tier q. 
Ftk(?,k> : Total fuel cost of generating unit i for time interval t in scenario k. This function 
represents the input/output characteristics of generating plant i. Besides any 
functional form could be used, we assumed this function is linear, like the following: 
Git(t, s): Fuel cost of dispatching energy during period t, given unit i is in state s. 
1 :  Generating unit index. 
I: Set of all generating units committed (available for generation). 
- 
pe : Pre-determined maximum short run cost of electricity 
pe : 
- 
Minimum price of electricity to recover revenue requirements 
Pel Short run marginal cost portion of real-time price of electricity at time t. 
- 
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ST;: 
Power output (kwh) of generating unit i for time interval t in scenario s. 
Probability associated with the outcome of state of nature k. 
Purchase spot price of electricity at time t. 
Export spot price of electricity at time t. 
Starting cost of generating unit i at time interval t. 
State transition costs (start-up and shut-down cost) from state r in period t-1 to state 
s in period t. 
Set of all possible states in period t in the dynamic programming formulation. 
Possible states are unit is on or unit is off. 
Minimum total cost (start up plus fuel costs) unit i accumu1att:d from the first period 
up to state s in period t. 
Discrete variable, indicates that unit i is on at time t if equal to 1 ,  and off if equal 0. 
Lagrangean multipliers of demand constraint in period t scenario k. 
P, : Lagrangean multipliers of reserve constraint in period t .  
u,,I:DLUC) : Objective function value of the dual of the unit commitment 1,agrangean relaxation 
u I: LUC) : Objective function value of the unit commitment lagrangean relaxation 
VI.3.1 A methodology for the modified real-time price calculation 
Load uncertainty becomes an important factor in calculating the final price in a RTP 
prclgram that announces its prices weekly. The utility can actually attribute probability to 
different scenarios, given system historic data, hence the procedure for determining the marginal 
fuel cost portion of RTP called is planning under risk. The electric utility has a wide range of 
tools to forecast possible energy system scenarios in the short to medium planning horizon, such 
as, time series, weather response and adaptive forecasting models [I]. 
Table VI.2 lists basic steps the method follows. The utility must take ithe first step and 
determine possible non participant load scenarios for the planning period ahead and associated 
outcome probability. For each scenario the utility will estimate all non-partici~pant load, reserve 
requirements, hourly buying and selling electricity prices and hourly interconnection capacity to 
import and export power. The utility must select also 3 quantity tiers to propose to the RTP 
participant customers. This quantity selection uses previous utility knowledge and observation 
of IXTP participant usage. Next, the utility will solve one two-stage unit commitment problem 
the for each tier level, q. Each two-stage unit commitment solution must provide a feasible 
cornrnitment strategy and dispatching solution for every hour in the planning horizon of all 
scenarios. The dispatching solution must minimize the expected dispatching he1  costs. Each 
Table VI.2 Real-time price determination algorithm 
- 
1. Estimate possible scenarios for non participant loads 
1.1. Load for each customer class 
1.2. Reserve Requirements 
1.3. Import and Export Energy Prices 
1.4. Scenario Probabilities 
2. Estimate possible load tier for RTP participant loads 
2.1. Possible Participant Load Levels 
3. Solve unit commitment under risk 
4. Utility communicates to participant price schedule to participants. 
5. Participant determines its expected consumption. 
6. Participant communicates to utility tier selected. 
7. Utility adopts minimal cost strategy. 
- 
energy utilization tier determines a different unit commitment and marginal file1 price solution. 
Hence the marginal fuel costs and unit commitment mix in each hour will be used to calculate the 
RTP of each utilization tier. Return to fix cost and other contractual requirements are factor in 
the final price as adders to the marginal fuel cost depending on the unit commitment 
corrfiguration at each hour. 
VI.3.2 Two-stage unit commitment model 
The unit commitment problem objective is to minimize generating units on, off and fuel 
cost considering the dynamic dependencies of each time interval in the planning horizon. This 
problem is equivalent to the capacitated plant location problem [4], which m?y use a dynamic 
prc~gramming or mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for the solution. Usually the 
commitment problem assumes a single scenario that may occur with probability equals to one. 
Th:~s kind of formulation does not address demand uncertainty because it analyzes only the most 
1ikr:ly outcome during the planning horizon. Under the conditions of low variation of demand or 
resource prices, this approach is acceptable, since one expects that the minimum expected cost of 
promduction maybe very close to the minimum mean cost of production. 
We formulated the unit commitment problem as a MIP and changed the traditional model 
into a two-stage problem to introduce the decision analysis under risk. The two-stage 
formulation explicitly deals with decisions in the present (here and now variables) that will affect 
decisions in the future (there-and-then variables) [ I t ? ] .  In the two-stage unit commitment 
prc'blem commitment, the present decision of having a unit turn on during time period t in  the 
future must consider its affects over a set of possible demand scenarios in the future. The two- 
stage programming treats sequential decisions as the risk averse individual would, given a 
decision today will reduce the set of possible alternatives in the future, one should fix the present 
that minimizes present costs and expected future costs. 
Since the utility wants a reduce its risk, it must consider the alternative behavior of loads 
that are hard to forecast (non participants). No matter which scenario the future revels, the utility 
must have a commitment capable to serve it. The traditional one scenario approach may take a 
pessimistic or average scenario and minimize its commitment and dispatching costs. The route 
thi:; paper takes is to consider three possible scenarios and run the two-stage unit commitment 
model with these scenarios for each RTP tier. Note that the RTP tiers, once selected by the 
customer are considered fixed, hence reducing forecasting variability. The multiple scenario 
methodology is advantageous over the one scenario methodology if the average overestimation 
ant1 underestimation costs of the former are significantly lower than the one from the latter. This 
may be the case in the case of a more competitive industry with the advent of the one-hour 
energy markets (import and export energy), where planning ahead and risk will start to have 
higher weight in, where planning ahead and risk will start to have higher weight in electricity 
prices. 
Equation VI. 1 shows the objective function of the two-stage unit comimitment model. 
The objective function divides the here-and-now variables as the ones without k subscript from 
the there-and-then variables, with the k subscript. There-and-then variables have one instance for 
each possible scenario in the future. Each unit may be in two states on or off 1(u~,=1 or 0, here- 
ancl-now variables), which will be the same for every scenario. Each possible combinations of 
the on and off units determines a system state in any particular time period for all scenarios. 
Each time a unit is turned on there is a cost associated with it, which is represented by the ST; 
parameter. Shut down costs can be considered in the same way, besides they -weren't in the 
current formulation. For every scenario and time period all possible system state must be 
analyzed to determine the dispatching strategy with that provides the minimurn fuel cost to 
traverse the period. For each scenario, the energy units' output, import and export energy must 
be determined to minimize the output cost expected value(second set of braces). 
Equation VI. 1 Two-stage unit commitment problem objective function. 
The objective function minimization process must satisfy demand, reserve, unit 
generation limit, import limit and export limit constraints for all time periods. Note that unit 
generating limit constraint are the link to the two stages of the problem, since energy output must 
satisfy demand constraints on every scenario k, but there is only one commitment solution for all 
scenarios. Reserve constraints must satisfy the scenarios expected demand and the reserve 
margin for all time periods. Import and export energy levels . 
iel 
Equation VI.2 Demand constraints. 
'dt E T,'dk E K-  
Equation VI.3 Reserve constraints. 
- 
P,  I 3. u, , and P, 5 c. u, ' d t ~ T , ' d i ~ I , ' d k ~ K  
Equation VI.4 Unit generation lower and upper bounds. Note that if the unit i is not committed 
in period t  and u;, = 0 then energy output is fixed at zero. 
u;, = 0 or 1 ' d t € T , ' d i € I  
Equation VI.5 Integrality constraints for state of unit i  at time t .  
<:>o and ' d t ~ T , ' d k ~ K  
Equation VI.6 Energy imports lower and upper bounds. 
F$20 and cf 5c 
Equation VI.7 Energy exports lower and upper bounds. 
The utility also faces the dispatching problem at the unit commitment level, because it 
needs to determine the output of each spinning generating unit. The probability weight sum of 
the fuel cost equations in the objective function represents total expected fuel used to serve 
demand. The fuel cost equations we use in this problem are a linear equation for the sake of 
solution simplicity, however other functional forms may be used with the same general solution 
algorithm. 
cr , (P lk )  = a ,  + P ; L  
Equation VI.8 Fuel cost equation 
VI.3.3 Lagrangean relaxation solution method 
Merlin [ l l ]  and Zhuang [19] solved the one stage problem using a lagrangean relaxation 
search method. The same method with appropriate modifications is used in this paper. Note that 
the solution this method is a heuristic solution to the actual optimal, but it was adopted because 
of problem dimensions and solution time requirements. 
Equation VI.9 shows the lagrangean relaxed objective function of the two-stage unit 
cornmitrnent problem, which adds the demand and reserve constraints in the objective function, 
weighted by lagrangean multipliers. Constraints of the minimum and maximum generation 
capacity remain unchanged. The problem is still a minimization subject to Equation VI.4, 
Equation VI.5, Equation VI.6, and Equation VI.7. To reduce notation we call 
Dl, = Dlq (pa, ) - Elk , since the index q does not vary in each unit commitment problem. 
Equation VI.9 Objective function of the lagrangean two-stage unit commitment problem. 
Demand and reserve constraints were included in the objective function. 
If we reorder the variables, one can notice that the problem becomes separable in the 
units i. However, we still must find a way to determine the values of the lagrangean multipliers. 
Since the lagrangean multipliers are variables of the dual problem (DLUC), one can solve the 
dual transforming the objective function as Equation VI.10 shows. 
u (DLUC) = max - 
e,k 2 - q.y,,e, < e . ~ ~ ~  V t € T , V i € I  
uir = 0 or 1 V t  E T,Vi E I 1 
Equation VI.10 Objective function of the dual problem of the lagrangean two-stage unit 
cornmitrnent problem. 
After some reorganization we present in Equation VI. 1 1  the dual of the two-stage unit 
cotnmitment lagrangean relaxation objective function. This problem is subject to constraints 
imposed by Equation VI.4, Equation VI.5, Equation V1.6, and Equation VI.7. 
Equation VI. 1 1 Two-stage dual lagrangean objective function. 
u (, (DLUC) = max. 
L , . ~ P ,  
Equation VI. 1 1  divides the problem in three parts, each one of them presented in a 
different line of the equation. Starting by the bottom, the third line is the primal minimization 
decision variables associated to the power generating units, namely the unit commitment 
variable, and power generated. The second line represents the primal minimization of decision 
variables associated with power exported and power imported. The first line, finally, has no 
primal variables and, therefore, requires no the minimize operator. The third lline of Equation 1 1  
is separable in sub-problems of individual units i. Note, however, that the sub-problems still 
have integer non-linear terms of integer variables that are not of trivial solution directly. The way 
to avoid the non-linearity is to transform each unit sub-problem in a dynamic programming 
formulation dealing with the unit commitment and dispatching decision of individual units. Each 
one of these sub-problems became extremely simple to solve since there are only 2 states to be 
searched in the DP tree. The unit sub-problem will decide weather to turn the unit on or off for 
each time period considering start-up costs and expected fuel costs given an expected dispatching 
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Equation VI. 12 Dynamic program state equation representing total cost accumulated when unit i 
changes from state r in time t-1 to state s at time t .  
The subscript of the units i represent that the costs are originated exclusively from that 
unit. Note also that G;,(t,sJ are exclusive from the unit. At this point the Lagrangean multipliers 
are fixed at some level and the state s determines if the unit is on or off, that is, if Git(t,s) is to be 
determined, or if it is zero, respectively. 
Equation VI. 13 Dual two-stage fuel cost problem for unit i in period t. 
VI.3.4 Calculating the final RTP price 
The final RTP price for each time period will be equal to the sum marginal fuel cost 
multipliers (from demand and reserve constraints) and an adder. The adder represents a return to 
fix or embedded costs of utility resources being (generating units, transmission and distribution 
lines) used during that time period. The adder represents the long run marginal valuation of 
capacity investments, and as such, will not guaranteed that its total revenues equal embedded 
costs unless the utility capacity is optimal. Note that the final price for tier q uses the multipliers 
of !separate runs of the unit commitment algorithm. We avoid to include this index before to save 
the reader from another symbol. The adder may vary over time and tier depending on what 
resources were used during a time period. For example, if for serving the high tier the unit 
commitment solution requires a gas turbine was turn on in period t, the adder will include an 
extra remuneration for this fix investment. 
pe,,, = E ( q )  + p: + Adder," 
Equation 14 Calculation of RTP based on marginal fuel costs. 
VI. 16 
VI.4. Testing the method 
In order to test the method we used data from a large midwest utility and the interruptible 
power consumption of some of its customers. Table VI.3 shows the possible scenarios 
considered and price tiers. Each row requires the solution of a full two-stage unit commitment 
problem that includes all the column represented scenarios. The experiment assumed a period of 
high consumption like summer. It used the high scenario as the annual average hourly demand 
plus 2.5 times the standard error observed in that hour. The medium and lower scenario used the 
sanne kind of calculation, but with standard error times 2 and 1.5. 
VI.5. Empirical Results 
Figure VI.l shows some preliminary results of our research. The colu~mns in the graphs 
show the expected participant load (tier) and the lines the marginal fuel costs. The lowest line 
shows reserve constraints shadow costs (reserve marginal fuel costs = MU = p., ), the group of 
1int:s in the center of the graphs show the demand constraints shadow costs (demand marginal 
fuel costs = LAMBDA =A, ) of the three scenarios. Finally, the higher line represents the sum of 
the reserve and expected demand marginal costs, what would be the marginal fuel cost portion of 
Table VI.3 Scenarios and Tiers 
Tiers I High Medium Low 
- 
Load System Load Scenario 
High AvSYS+2.5.~tdSYS AvSYS+2.0.~tdSYS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + 1 . 5 . ~ t d ~ ~ ~  
AvRTP+2.0.StdRTP AvRTP+2.0.StdRTP AvRTP+2.0.StdRTP 
Medium AvSYS+2.5.~tdSYS AvSYS+2.0.~tdSYS A V ~ ~ ~ +  1 .5.stdSYS 
AvRTP AvRTP AvRTP 
the RTP price. All the solutions were at least 5% of the true optimal. 
The results did not show much difference in the final lagrangean multipliers. We 
attribute this to three reasons. First, the data sampling was too low for the utility installed 
capacity, since the high scenario could not cover the utility observed peak. Second the utility in 
question has notorious excess capacity problem, and it seems that the amount of interruptible 
power involved in this rate did not significantly change the commitment of units. Finally, the 
finitl adder is not considered at this point and some gas turbines were actually used in the high 
tier while not in the low or medium tier. The final values of the objective differ in about 100 
thousand dollars between two consecutive tiers. What show potential savings over the current 
system, if this amount of savings would be enough to implement a program as this, the utility 
stockholders and commissioners should be the ones to answer. 
VI.5. Conclusions 
A more customer oriented electric service is better suited for a more competitive 
generation market, for handling environmental concerns, and for satisfying regional development 
packages [9]. In this sense RTP transfer decision power from the utility to the customer about 
how much electricity services worth at some time of the day or the year. Somt: customers may 
therefore prefer to change their consumption pattern or invest on equipment that would allow 
them to buy less from the utility during high price periods and more during lower price periods. 
Calculation of real-time price rate depends on the kind of electricity the customer is buying from 
the utility, but it will mainly reflect fuel and reliability costs. 
Advantage of using a RTP as described in this paper will depend on the current utility 
exc'zss capacity and amount of power exchange with neighbors. 
I... ... 
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Figure VI.1 Marginal fuel costs for low (a), medium (b) and high (c) load tiers. 
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